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A GOOD FAITH PURCHASE STUDY: TRUE
OWNERS AND THE WAREHOUSE LIEN
John Dolan*
The commercial concept of good faith purchase has been an
effective doctrine in the law of property and contract for facilitating changes necessary to a dynamic mercantile system. Today the
concept finds itself under attack. Professor Gilmore, whose definitive review of the doctrine twenty-seven years ago' has been required reading, now warns that the idea may have outlived its usefulness in some areas.2 He and others would, for example, restrict
severely its application in the law of "negotiable" 3 instruments."
At its elementary level, the good faith purchase doctrine depends on the question of possession. That question, in turn, rests
on the commercial value one accords possession and the way one
perceives the commercial expectations that arise from it.5 Consis* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.
1. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore, Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase].
2. The good faith purchase idea also played a notable role in the law of sales of
goods. I once attempted to deal with the development of the idea in the context of
both negotiable instruments law and sales law ... What I now think I missed in
that discussion (in both contexts) was that the economic conditions which led to
the triumph of the good faith purchaser before 1850 gradually ceased to exist after
1850-with the result that the idea no longer made much sense.
Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CRmom'oN L. Rsv. 441,
445-46 n.8 (1979) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
3. Without the doctrine of good faith purchase, negotiable instruments are negotiable
in name only. Abolition of the doctrine would deny to the good faith purchaser of commercial paper (the holder in due course) most of the protection that renders the good faith
purchaser's position different from that of the holder who does not achieve that status.
Compare U.C.C. § 3-305 with § 3-306 (All section references, unless otherwise noted, are to
the 1978 version of the Official Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter "Code"].).
4. See Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, supra note 2;
Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 375 (1971). Professor Rosenthal, whose article deals primarily with the holder in due course status of depositary banks,
makes it quite clear that he does not advocate doing away with the negotiability of checks in
all instances. Id. at 393-94. Professor Gilmore would go a step further. 'The whole 'holder in
due course' concept could usefully have been abolished when negotiable instruments law
was codified at the end of the nineteenth century." G. GmLiORE, THE DATH oF CoTrAncr
108 n.18 (1974).
5. In significant measure good faith purchase rests on two notions: first, that a per-
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tent, then, with the dissatisfaction that surrounds the doctrine of
good faith purchase is the fact that we find controversy surrounding the role of possession in commercial law.6
The dissatisfaction and controversy, however, do not signal
the demise of good faith purchase. The doctrine itself is a prerogative of the law for fashioning the stuff of the law's correlative doctrine-security of property. That correlative precept teaches that
no person may be deprived of property without consent and that a
taker receives no greater interest than the transferor enjoyed. As
commercial expectations change, the law must use good faith
purchase differently, now invoking it, now staying it, and all with
an eye to commercial reality. The debate we are witnessing over
son's possession of property sometimes raises reasonable expectations, and second, that we
should fashion property and contract law with due regard for those expectations. I will not
dwell in this article on the features of human nature that prompt such a regard for possession. Holmes described the property apect of it colorfully:
It is quite enough, therefore, for the law, that man, by an instifict which he shares
with the domestic dog, and of which the seal gives a most striking example, will
not allow himself to be dispossessed, either by force or fraud, of what he holds,
without trying to get it back again.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 213 (1881). More telling, however, is his suggestion that early
procedure favored possession over title. Id. at 165. Later law equated possession and title, or
nearly so. "Possession is nine-tenths of the law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (5th ed.
1979). "Possession vaut titre." (Possession is worth title.) Id. See also Epstein, Possession
as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L.
REv. 457, 477 (1897); Maitland, The Seisin of Chattels, 1 LAW Q. REv. 324 (1885). 1 have
considered in another article the role of these expectations in the conveyancing context. See
Dolan, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Concept of Possession in the Marketing
and Financingof Goods, 56 TEXAs L. REv. 1147 (1978). Those who would demote possession
from the lofty role it has played historically, then, are undermining the footings of good
faith purchase. Refer to note 6 infra. It suffices to say here that the success of their criticism, and in some measure it has succeeded and should succeed, depends on their ability to
come to grips with what appears to be a fact of human nature.
6. See, e.g., Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012,
1013-14 (1978) (characterizing "the old common law notion that 'possession' of property is
of utmost significance in the field now known as secured transactions. . ." as one of Article
9's "most intriguing trouble spots. . . ."); Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing
Buyer, 85 YALE L.J. 1 (1975) (criticizing the idea that a seller's creditor may reasonably rely
on the seller's possession of goods); Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing
Under Article 9 (pts. I and II), 59 B.U. L. REv. 1, 209 (1979) (a criticism of Code rules that
permit a secured party to perfect some security interests by possession rather than public
filing and of the ostensible ownership doctrine); Wiseman, Cash Sellers, Secured Financers
and the Meat Industry: An Analysis of Articles Two and Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 19 B.C. L. REv. 101 (1977) (criticizing the view that a buyer's creditor may reasonably
rely on the buyer's possession of goods); cf. Aronstein, Haydock, & Scott, Article 8 is Ready,
93 HARV. L. REv. 889 (1980); Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under
Revised Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1013 (1979) (two
articles debating the efficacy of a nonpossessory security interest in negotiable securities).
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the roles of good faith purchase and of possession is indispensable
to that process.
This article reviews the doctrine of good faith purchase in a
narrow and seldom considered context.7 The study is revealing in
two ways. First, it demonstrates the nature of the doctrine itself as
legislatures and courts utilize it to meet commercial exigencies.
Second, the study attempts to explain the warehouse lien section
of the Uniform Commercial (Code), a provision that harbors a
number of technical problems.
I.

INTRODUCTION

As a general rule, the significant disputes bailments generate
usually fall within the realm of secured transactions law or conveyancing rules and do not involve the bailee but do involve buyers,
sellers, and secured lenders. 8 Thus we tend to view a dispute involving the lien of the bailee itself under Code section 7-209, a
pure question of bailment law, as one of the quaint aspects of personal property.
That view obscures two important points. First, the owner of
goods who contests the bailee's lien is often a consumer; and
though the relative commercial value of the goods is small, the relative value to the consumer is great. Second, and more important,
is the fact that the rules which govern the owner/bailee dispute
reflect in microcosm the tensions which dominate commercial law
and thereby provide occasion to evaluate the role of personal property law's basic doctrines: security of property and good faith
purchase. Moreover, by virtue of the neglect we have accorded
these bailment disputes, courts, commercial lawyers, and consumer
lawyers have confused the careful pattern that the common law
and the legislatures fashioned to balance the competing interests.
This article, then, has two purposes. First, it uses the law of
7. For a treatment of the subject in the broad Code context, see Warren, Cutting off
Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. Ray. 469 (1963)

[hereinafter cited as Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership].
8. This article consciously does not deal with those questions or with the warehouse
security interest mentioned in U.C.C. § 7-209. That security interest is subject to the same
rules that apply to the warehouse lien, the proper subject of this paper, but is a rare creature of commercial law cases and, one suspects, of bailment practices. The questions of the
rights of persons who buy goods subject to bailment or who deal with warehouse receipts are
beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of some of them, see Dolan, Good Faith
Purchaseand Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles 2, 7. and 9 of the
U.C.C., 30 HASrNos L.J. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Dolan, Good Faith Purchase.
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bailments as a vehicle to consider the synthesis of property doctrines. In this regard, it is a study of good faith purchase. Second,
the article attempts to dispel the confusion recent cases have
wrought. The study deals primarily with cases involving warehouse
receipts, because most of the disputes arise in the storage rather
than the shipment context. The next four parts of the article analyze the statutory language; the pre-Code idea that a warehouse is
a pledgee; the cases decided under the Uniform Act, the Code's
predecessor; and the curious role of the statute's reference to the
paramount rights rule of section 7-503(1). Part VI reviews the
cases decided under the Code, and Part VII recapitulates the
themes, their technical problems, and their resolution.
The article concludes that the Code's warehouse lien provision
creates three good faith purchase shelters for the warehouse in a
contest with a nonbailor claimant: first, a pledge rule that cuts off
unperfected security interests; second, an estoppel rule that cuts
off claims by persons whose conduct clothed the bailor with apparent or implied authority to store; and third, a household goods rule
that cuts off all claims when the bailor was in lawful possession.
II.
A.

THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE

The Contest

It is now a well-settled principle with ancient antecedents9
that a bailee may hold goods against the bailor's obligation to pay
storage charges. 10 The principle recognizes the efficiency of permitting the bailee to "detain" the goods" against payment and
thereby encouraging bailees to provide storage to strangers or
others without the cost and delay of credit inquiry.'2 The law of
warehouses, carriers, innkeepers, and other bailees reflects the
common sense of that rule.
Generally, however, the rule assumes that the bailor is the
9. Ulpian taught that implicit in the lease of warehouse space is an agreement to hy.
pothecate the goods. See DiGsT 5.20.2.3.
10. In Yorke v. Grenaugh, 92 Eng. Rep. 79 (K.B. 1703), Lord Holt makes it clear that
common-law courts had long recognized the lien.
11. At common law, persons asserting a lien could detain the goods but had no right to
use or sell them. See, e.g., Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Phillips, 118 Mich. 162, 164-65, 76 N.W. 371,
371-72 (1898) (dictum) (corporation's lien on shareholder's stock); Thames Iron Works Co.
v. Patent Derrick Co., 70 Eng. Rep. 676, 677-78 (Ch. 1860) (seller's lien).
12. "The convenience of commerce and natural justice are on the side of liens .
Green v. Farmer, 98 Eng. Rep. 154, 158 (K.B. 1768) (Mansfield, J.).
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owner or "person entitled"1 3 to the goods; and generally the law
has been quick to reject a rule that permits a thief to bail goods
and thereby render them subject to a lien which the innocent owner must satisfy."' In fact, of course, thieves or other persons with-

out authority from the owner sometimes bail goods and the law
must deal with such situations. It does so by invoking two of the
law's favorite prerogatives: the conveyancing doctrines of security
of property and of good faith purchase.
Security of property, the first principle of an ordered system
of property law, teaches that no person may be deprived of property without consent"5 and that transferees may take no better
"title" than their transferors enjoy.16 Under that view thieves who
bail goods give the bailee nothing and do not bind the true owners
of the goods who, through no fault of their own, now find the goods
in the possession of a bailee asserting a lien. As a general rule the
common law used security of property in bailment cases to rule in
17
favor of the claimant and against the bailee's lien.
There are instances, however, when the security of property

precept yields inefficient or unfair results, and in those instances
the law has traditionally fashioned good faith purchase exceptions
to the security of property principle. These exceptions estop the
owner from asserting a prior interest against a person who takes
13. The Code uses the term "person entitled." See U.C.C. § 7-403(1), (4). Sometimes
the dispute is not between the true owner and the bailee but between a secured creditor of
the true owner and the bailee. Thus we have true owners and secured parties who are
"claimants" asserting an interest in the goods prior to the warehouse lien.
14. See 3 N.Y. L. REvisIoN COMMlSSION REP., STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 1800, 1817 (1955); 2 N.Y. L. REviSION CO MMISSION REP., HEARINGS ON TuE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 708, 777, 786-87 (1954); but cf. id. at 731, 796; Yorke v. Grenaugh, 92
Eng. Rep. 79 (K.B. 1703) (suggesting that a thief may in some instances impose a lien on
goods which the true owner must satisfy).
15. See, e.g., Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug. 1, 12 (Mich. 1843). For further discussion of
the conveyancing rules, see Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework- Conveyancing Principlesand
Property Interests, 59 B.U. L. Rev. 811 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Dolan, U.C.C.
Framework].
16. 'Title, like a stream, can rise no higher than its source." Barthelmess v. Cavalier, 2
Cal. App. 2d 477, 487, 38 P.2d 484, 490 (1934). The Roman law is in accord: "Nemo plus
juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet." Wheelwright v. Depeyster, 1 Johns. 471,
479 (N.Y. 1806) (no one can transfer more right to another than he has himself) (BLAcK's
LAW DicTIONARY 936 (5th ed. 1979)).
17. See, e.g., Services Co. v. O'dell, Pa. 2d 417 A2d 604 (1980) (garage
lien); Hanch v. Ripley, 127 Ind. 151, 26 N.E. 70 (1890) (agister's lien); Jarchow & Sons v.
Pickens, 51 Iowa 381, 1 N.W. 598 (1879) (landlord's lien); Denison v. Shuler, 47 Mich. 598.
11 N.W. 402 (1882) (repairman's lien); McGhee v. Edwards, 87 Tenn. 506, 11 S.W. 316
(1889) (livery stable's lien).
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for value and in good faith. Holders in due course of negotiable
instruments,"8 bona fide purchasers of securities," and buyers in
ordinary course of goods,20 for example, all benefit from good faith
purchase treatment.
The good faith purchase rules operate on one or more normative assumptions. Lord Mansfield held that the holder in due
course of a bearer note, for example, defeats the true owner because, by any other rule, trade and commerce would be "incommoded."' 21 Good faith purchasers of goods out of inventory become

buyers in ordinary course and defeat one who entrusted the
merchant with possession, because commercial lawyers viewed such
entrustment as misleading buyers and permitting them to rely, to
their detriment, on their sellers' possession.22 Courts have fashioned similar rules for owners whose conduct creates "ostensible"
ownership in third parties, 28 and legislatures have estopped owners
whose conduct makes it possible for a thief or fraud to mislead an
innocent third party.2 4 There is a measure of moral judgment,
then, in the good faith purchase doctrine, which some courts see as
an instance of allocating the loss between two "innocent" parties.
One court observed that the true owner of goods loses to the good
faith purchaser, because "surely it is more just that the burthen
should fall on the defendants, who were guilty of negligence . ..

2

Finally, the intent of the true owner may give rise to good
18. U.C.C. § 3-302 defines the term "holder in due course." Section 3-305 posits the
good faith purchase benefit for such a holder.
19. U.C.C. § 8-302 defines the term "bona fide purchaser" and describes the protection
afforded such a purchaser.
20. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) defines "buyer in ordinary course." Protection for such a buyer
occurs in transactions described by §§ 2-403(2), 7-205, and 9-307(1).
21. Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (K.B. 1758).
22. "Where the commodity is sent in such a way and to such a place as to exhibit an
apparent purpose of sale, the principal will be bound, and the purchaser safe." Pickering v.
Busk, 104 Eng. Rep. 758, 761 (K.B. 1812). At common law Pickering was the minority view.
See generally 2 S. WILIsToN, THE LAW GOVERNING THE SAE OF GOODS § 317 (rev. ed. 1948).
The Code, however, adopts the Pickering rule. See U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2), 9-307(1).
23. See, e.g., Silver v. Robert's Garage, Inc., 240 Mass. 571, 574, 134 N.E. 610, 611-12
(1922) (silence in the face of seller's assertion of ownership estops the owner); Nixon v.
Brown, 57 N.H. 34, 36 (1876) (delivery of horse with bill of sale estops owner).
24. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (voidable title rule which permits a fraudulent party to
convey good title); §§ 3-405(1), 3-406, 4-406 (rules of commercial paper which favor a purchaser over a true owner whose conduct permitted theft or fraud).
25. White v. Garden, 138 Eng. Rep. 364, 367 (C.P. 1851) (voidable title case) (emphasis added); cf. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (the Code's voidable title rule).
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faith purchase results. Under the early formulation of the doctrine
of voidable title,26 a true owner who conveyed property to a fraudulent buyer could avoid the conveyance only so long as the fraud
had not reconveyed to a good faith purchaser.27 The rule found
exceptions, however, in cases where the owner intended to deal not
with the fraudulent party but with someone else. 28 The Code ap-

pears to reject the "intent" rationale. 9
The contest, then, between the nonbailor owner of bailed
goods and the bailee is but one of many between the law's famous
two innocent parties: the true owner on the one hand and the good
faith purchaser on the other. Furthermore, it is often not the true
owner, but a secured party, claiming through the true owner, who
wrestles with the warehouse lien.30
This article analyzes that contest in terms of good faith
purchase history. The analysis and the language of the statutes
suggests that the legislatures have commanded a balancing approach between security of property and good faith purchase. The
recent cases, however, display an unawareness of both the legislative command and the common law's historical treatment of the
dispute.
B. Section 7-209
Today these bailment disputes arise primarily in the storage
setting. The sources of the law governing the dispute are statutory,31 but the statute invokes common-law principles.
26. Voidable title is a good faith purchase doctrine, which has long been the target of
criticism. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1059; Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership, supra note 7, at 475. The Code adopts the voidable title doctrine in § 2-403(1).
27. See, e.g., Mowrey v. Walsh, 8 Cow. 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
28. See, e.g., Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459, 465-66 (H.L. 1878).
29. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(a).
30. Article 9 defers to Article 7 for purposes of determining the relative priority of a
security interest and a warehouse lien. Generally, Article 9 renders a possessory lien for
services prior to an earlier perfected security interest. U.C.C. § 9-310. That rule, however,
does not operate if the statute creating the lien provides otherwise. Id. Thus Article 9 sends
us to Article 7. Ironically, Article 7, by virtue of the pledge rule of § 7-209(3), incorporates
the priority rules of Article 9. Refer to notes 84-113 infra and accompanying text.
31. Much of the textual discussion applies to liens arising out of shipments as well as
those arising out of storage. The statutes are the Federal Bills of Lading Act (Pomerene
Act), 49 U.S.C. §§ 81-124 (1976), and Article 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The former governs shipments of goods on common carriers unless the shipment is entirely intrastate. 49 U.S.C. § 81 (1976); U.C.C. § 7-103. Section 105 of the Act defines the federal lien
rule. For shipments entirely intrastate, U.C.C. § 7-307 governs.
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Section 7-209(3) ostensibly defines only two rules which afford
the warehouse good faith purchase treatment against the true owner. 2 The first arises when the person entitled "so entrusted the
bailor with possession of the goods that a pledge of them by him to
a good faith purchaser for value would have been valid. . .. "I's
That rule does not apply, however, against a person with "paramount rights" under section 7 -503.s That exception, we shall see,
carries important implications-enough to constitute a separate
rule of good faith purchase. The second defined rule, which has not
been adopted by most jurisdictions, applies when "the depositor
was the legal possessor of. . . [household] . . . goods at the time
of deposit. ' - 5 In short, section 7-209(3), the good faith purchase
rule of the warehouse lien section, has three components: a pledge
rule, which we will see comes from the prior uniform statute; an
exception, which incorporates the notion of paramount rights; and
a household goods rule. Study of these components reveals many
of the features of good faith purchase law. The study begins with a
review of the common-law cases.
Before we turn to those cases, however, it is necessary to raise
three questions. First, what does the lien section mean when it
gives the warehouse the rights of a pledgee? Cases construing the
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the source of the pledge language, reveal that the intent of the section is to give the warehouse
the priority of a perfected secured party under Article 9.30
The second question relates to the household goods rule of
32.

U.C.C. § 7-209(3) provides:
(a) A warehouseman's lien for charges and expenses under subsection (1) or a
security interest under subsection (2) is also effective against any person who
so entrusted the bailor with possession of the goods that a pledge of them by

him to a good faith purchaser for value would have been valid but is not
effective against a person as to whom the document confers no right in the
goods covered by it under Section 7-503.
(b) A warehouseman's lien on household goods for charges and expenses in

relation to the goods under subsection (1) is also effective against all persons
if the depositor was the legal possessor of the goods at the time of deposit.
"Household goods" means furniture, furnishings and personal effects used by
the depositor in a dwelling.

33.

U.C.C. § 7-209(3)(a). "[The] circumstances must be such that a pledge by the de-

positor to a good faith purchaser for value would have been valid." Id., Comment 3.

34. "A document of title confers no right in goods against a person who before issuance of the document had a legal interest or a perfected security interest in them. .... "
U.C.C. § 7-503(1).
35. U.C.C. § 7-209(3)(b).
36. Refer to notes 84-113 infra.
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subsection 7-209(3)(b). That rule permits a warehouse to enforce
its lien against the true owner of household goods so long as the
bailor was in lawful possession of them. Do good faith purchase
considerations justify this extension of the lien beyond the traditional bounds of good faith purchase? Analysis suggests that this
rule has the effect of assisting the sheriff in forcible detainer cases,
though there is other justification for the rule. Such a reading is
significant especially in those jurisdictions which have not adopted
subsection 3(b).87 In those jurisdictions there may be good faith
purchase grounds, though this article questions them,3" to challenge the lien in consumer cases where constitutional challengess"
have failed.
Third, what is the purpose of the Code's reference to the paramount rights rule of section 7-503? Section 7-209(3) first posits the
rule that the lien is good against the owner if a pledge would be
good against the owner. It cautions, however, that the lien is never
good against a person with paramount rights. A review of the preCode cases and the drafting history of the lien section and reference to the good faith purchase exceptions which the Code itself
carves out of the paramount rights rule' 0 indicate that the reference incorporates those exceptions and thereby gives the warehouse rights broader than those available under the "pledge"
37. In 1966 the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code adopted
subsection (3)(b) as an amendment to § 7-209. 2A UNwoRM LAws ANNOTATED, UNIFORu
COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-209(3)(b) (1977). The amendment consisted of a provision California

included in its original version of § 7-209(3). Id. After the Board sponsored the amendment
and as of June 1, 1980, twelve more jurisdictions adopted it- Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming. Id. (Supp. 1980). In addition, Idaho, North Carolina, and Virginia adopted the
amendment in modified form. Id. Oregon fashioned a rule which authorized the legal possessor of any goods, not just household furnishings, to store those goods with the warehouse.
OR. Rav. STAT. § 77.2090(3) (1979). The Texas rule is unique and appears to render the lien
superior to a prior security interest with some limitations. See T. Bus. & CoM CODE ANN.
§ 7-209(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
38. Refer to text accompanying notes 114-30 infra.
39. Refer to note 130 infra.
40. One loses paramount rights in the goods if that person
(a) delivered or entrusted them or any document of title covering them to the
bailor or his nominee with actual or apparent authority to ship, store or sell or
with power to obtain delivery under this Article (Section 7-403) or with power of
disposition under this Act (Sections 2-403 and 9-307) or other statute or rule of
law... [or]...
(b) acquiesced in the procurement by the bailor or his nominee of any document of title.
U.C.C. § 7-503(1).
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language.4'

Section B of Part IV considers cases under the Uniform Act
and considers the meaning of the "pledge" language of section 7209(3)(a). Section C addresses the second question, the provocative
case of the evicting constable. Part V considers the reference in
section 7-209(3)(a) to the paramount rights rule, the third question. These inquires, however, must abide a review of the commonlaw rule.
HI. COMMON-LAw CASES

Because security of property is the first principle of property
law, all good faith purchase doctrine consists of exceptions to the
first principle. Each inquiry begins with that principle, and the
party who wishes to upset the security of property result must effect an exception. If the bailee who desires to assert a lien against a
remote true owner fails to establish the exception, the true owner
prevails without more. The common-law history of disputes between bailees and true owners is the history of those efforts.
The leading case is Yorke v. Grenaugh.42 There Lord Holt observed that an innkeeper, because he was obliged by law to accept
a guest's horse, could enforce the lien against the true owner, even
though the traveler may have been a thief.4"
The case is remarkable first of all in that it constitutes a significant departure from the first rule of property law-the security
of property doctrine. That doctrine attempts to frustrate the lawless taker. It exposes the thief's transferee to the claim of the true
owner and thereby encourages transferees to inquire about title
-an inquiry the thief cannot satisfy. In fact, the first corollary of
security of property doctrine is the rule that "a thief cannot give
good title."' 44 Yorke, by favoring the bailee, departs from those se41. Refer to text accompanying notes 163-94 infra.
42. 92 Eng. Rep. 79 (K.B. 1703).
43. Although Lord Holt spoke for the majority when he posited the rule of the Yorke
case, he dissented from the holding in favor of the innkeeper on the grounds that the innkeeper failed to prove that the traveler was the innkeeper's guest and, therefore, failed to
show that he was bound to take the horse. Id. at 80.
44. Thieves, in fact, are not purchasers; and only a scoundrel would "steal anything
and call it purchase." W. SHAKESPEARE, HERY V, AcT 3, Sc. 3. Purchase is, of course, a
voluntary transfer. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (33). In the Middle Ages, English law imposed on
purchasers the burden of showing that they did not take from a thief. Failure to satisfy that
burden left them "in peril." 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENOLAND 427 (S.
Thorne trans. 1968). Thus the practice arose of purchasing in public at fairs and markets,
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curity of property principles.
There are, of course, analogues to the Yorke rule in the law of
paper. As we have seen, it is well settled that good faith purchasers
of negotiable instruments, documents, and securities in bearer
form will defeat the true owner even though the purchaser takes
from a thief. These rules, codified in the paper articles of the
Code,4 5 reflect the perceived need, questioned by some, for celerity
in the commerce of such items. To put paper purchasers on title
inquiry, traditional thinking concludes, will retard the transfer of
that paper to a degree that the law regards as inefficient.40 Similarly, in Yorke the court held explicitly that the innkeeper without
knowledge of the true owner's claim is not obliged to question the
47
title of his guest.
The Yorke opinion, moreover, makes it clear that the court
rests its decision to dispense with the bailee's duty to inquire into
title on the fact that the innkeeper is obliged to accept a traveler
and baggage.4 e Lord Holt broke with the majority in Yorke because
he felt the innkeeper had failed to show that the bailor of the
horse was a guest of the inn.4 Absent such a showing, Holt felt,
the innkeeper was not obliged to take the horse and, therefore, lost
the benefit of the rule. Similarly, in King v. Richards,0 an early
American case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that the
rule of Yorke applies only to those bailees under a duty to accept
the goods.5 1 Bailment law fashioned a similar rule for common carriers who faced the same duty. 2 It is significant that the general
before witnesses. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 81-82 (4th ed. 1936).

45. Refer to notes 18-20 supra.
46. See, e.g., Peacock v. Rhodes, 99 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (K.B. 1781); Miller v. Race, 97
Eng. Rep. 398, 401-02 (K.B. 1758); see generally Beutel, The Development of Negotiable
Instruments in Early English Law, 51 Hv. L. REv. 813 (1938).
47. Accord, Johnson v. Hill, 171 Eng. Rep. 812 (LB. 1822).
48. See also Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill 485 (N.Y. 1842). In the 17th century the law
regarded innkeepers much as modern law regards public utilities. Innkeepers could not refuse lodging to a traveler and their prices were subject to review. See Newton v. Trigg, 89
Eng. Rep. 474, 566 (K.B. 1692).
49. Yorke v. Grenaugh, 92 Eng. Rep. 79, 80 (K.B. 1703).
50. 6 Whart. 418 (Pa. 1841).
51. Id. at 422-23 (dictum).
52. The American common-law rule protected the connecting carrier. See RErATEMEW OF SECUR=T § 61(b) (1941). The American cases, however, refused protection to the
initial carrier, indicating that the carrier had no duty to accept goods from a party who had
no authority to ship them. E.g., Robinson v. Baker, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 137, 144-45 (1849);
Corinth Engine & Boiler Works v. Mississippi Cent. R.R., 95 Miss. 817, 824, 49 So. 261, 262
(1909). The courts concluded that the initial carrier would just have to collect payment in
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bailment rule reflects security of property notions and renders the
lien subject to claims. Yorke and its progeny, then, are good faith
purchase exceptions to the general rule.
The Yorke rule balances the policy against making theft easy
with the need to promote lodging for travelers" and storage for
goods and appears to rest on notions of economic efficiency. If innkeepers did not enjoy good faith purchase protection, they would
store goods at their peril and would be forced to insist on payment
in advance or to raise prices. Advance payment, however, is an
inefficient solution, because the travelers may not know how long
they will stay, and the parties cannot compute the storage charges.
The bailor will either overpay or underpay-both of which are less
efficient than giving the bailee a lien. Inefficiency theoretically increases costs which increase prices; and increased prices are con04
trary to an essential objective of the market system.
The clarity of these early cases, however, suffers at the hands
of other decisions. In Wright v. Snell," the bailee attempted to
assert a general lien against goods it held for a customer who owed
the bailee for services rendered in connection with other goods.50
advance. E.g., Hudson Motor Car Co. v. Erie R.R., 109 N.J.L. 431, 433, 162 A. 604, 605
(1932); Vaughan v. Providence & Worc. R.R., 13 R.I. 578, 579 (1882). See also N.Y. L. REVISION COMMISSION

REP.,

REPORT AND APPENDICES RELATING TO THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE 444 (1956). The English rule appears to have been different at the time of Lord Holt.
Id.; Yorke v. Grenaugh, 92 Eng. Rep. 79, 80 (K.B. 1703); cf. Hayden v. Wabash Ry., 269 Ill.
App. 356, 180 N.E. 795 (1933); Metzger v. Columbia Terminals Co., 227 Mo. App. 135, 50
S.W.2d 680 (1932); Hudson Motor Car Co. v. Erie R.R., 109 N.J.L. 431, 162 A. 604 (1932)
(cases holding that chattel mortgagee defeats carrier's lien under Federal Bills of Lading
Act); see also U.C.C. § 7-307(2) (creating a lien good against the true owner of goods "which
the carrier was required by law to receive. .. ").
53. According to the traditional rationale, the law required innkeepers and other bailees to accept all comers as long as there was room, because the bailee had chosen a "public
calling." See Lane v. Cotton, 91 Eng. Rep. 1332, 1336 (K.B. 1701). There is another explanation for the rule, however. "One adversely inclined might say that it was one of many signs
that the law was administered in the interest of the upper classes." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW

203 (1881).

54. Early decisions, however, were not hidebound to this good faith purchase rule. An
innkeeper, for example, who admittedly did "to a gentle and necessary degree" remove the
coat from the back of a nonpaying diner, failed to convince a horror-stricken bench that the
law should carry good faith purchase to the point to protecting such conduct: "[I]f the innkeeper take the coat off his back, and that prove to be an insufficient pledge, he may go on
and strip him naked; and that would apply either to a male or to a female. That consequence is so utterly absurd, that it cannot be intertained for a moment." Sunbolf v. Alford,
150 Eng. Rep. 1135, 1136, 1138 (Ex. 1838).
55. 106 Eng. Rep. 1219 (K.B. 1822). Wright involved a shipment of goods consigned to
the bailee's debtor.
56. Bailment law distinguishes the bailee's general lien, which permits bailees to hold
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The- court rejected the claim.57 It could have done so on the
grounds that a good faith purchase rule in favor of the specific lien
goes far enough to encourage bailees to accept goods and that there
was no policy reason to enforce the general lien against the true
owner. It is unfortunate that the Wright opinion did not make the
distinction between the general and the specific lien. Rather, it emphasized the fact that the bailee's debtor/customer had no interest
in the goods and that the true owner did. Such an ownership distinction, of course, exists in all of these cases. It is the existence of
a true owner other than the bailee which gives rise to the dispute,
and the Wright court's rationale is, therefore, of little help. The
Wright case, however, does not stand alone.
Two early New York cases 8s follow similar reasoning. They rejected the bailee's lien claim on the grounds that the bailor, a conditional buyer, had not satisfied the condition of the sale; that the
conditional seller still held title to the goods; and, therefore, that
the lien was not good against the seller.59 Thus the New York
courts adopted a security of property approach without balancing
that policy against good faith purchase considerations.
Two Michigan cases reflect the same tendency in one case and
a divergent view in another. In Fitch v. Newberry,0 a bill of lading
case, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that a carrier must accept
goods only if the bailor is authorized to ship them.0 1 Because the
bailee took the goods from someone lacking that authority, the
court refused to enforce the lien against the true owner.02 The
Fitch court purports to distinguish Yorke on the authority question. s Yet it is difficult to conceive of a clearer rejection of Yorke.
Under the Yorke rule bailees may dispense with title inquiry;
under Fitch they must pursue it. In fact the Fitch opinion is replete with security of property language." The weakness in Fitch
goods against all debts from the customer to the bailee, and the specific lien, which permits
them to hold goods only against charges relating to those goods. See U.C.C. § 7-209(1);
RESTATEMENT OF SECuRrrY § 60 (1941). Refer to text accompanying notes 141-62 infra.
57. 106 Eng. Rep. at 1221.
58. Collman v. Collins, 2 Hall 569 (N.Y. Super. 1829); Van Buskirk v. Purinton, 2 Hall
561 (N.Y. Super. 1829).
59. See Collman v. Collins, 2 Hall at 575-78; Van Buskirk v. Purinton, 2 Hall at 565.
60. 1 Doug. 1 (Mich. 1843).
61. Id. at 10-11.
62. Id. at 18.
63. Id. at 8-9.
64. E.g., "No man can be deprived of his property without his own consent." Id. at 12.

280

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:267

is not its decision to reject good faith purchase doctrine, however;
it is the failure to consider it. Fitch, nonetheless, is probably a
majority view in bill of lading cases.6 5
Ironically, the second Michigan case ignores security of property for good faith purchase in the extreme. In R.L. Polk & Co. v.
Melenbacker,6 6 the Michigan Court enforced the bailee's lien because the owner of the goods entrusted them to the bailor.67 The
common law has long recognized that entrustment alone is not
enough to invoke good faith purchase doctrine. Possession is only
one indication of ownership." Delivery, however, accompanied by
documentary evidence of ownership tips the scales in favor of good
faith purchase;6 9 delivery to a person who sells goods of the kind,
especially at the location where the goods are delivered, 0 prompts
courts to bend the security of property rule in favor of the good
faith purchaser. 71 Thus, the Melenbacker opinion stretches good
faith purchase doctrine to its limits despite the earlier Michigan
case, Fitch, which opted for strict security of property.
The common-law cases, then, are inconsistent. On the one
hand we see them choosing good faith purchase, on the other, security of property. It is disconcerting to note, furthermore, that the
American cases tend to apply one of these two competing doctrines
as if the one they choose were the only choice. In the New York
cases, the court invoked security of property as if such a result
were preordained. Similarly, the Michigan cases invoke first one
rule and then the other without explaining the apparent
inconsistency.
There is a simple enough explanation for this behavior: the
courts do not recognize the owner/bailee dispute as a security of
property/good faith purchase contest. That failure prevents the
courts from considering the policies that the two doctrines serve.
65. Refer to note 52 supra.
66. 136 Mich. 611, 99 N.W. 867 (1904).
67. Id. at 614, 99 N.W. at 868.
68. See, e.g., Fawcett v. Osborne, 32 IlM. 411, 425 (1863); Farrell v. Harlem Terminal
Storage Warehouse Co., 70 Misc. 565, 567, 127 N.Y.S. 306, 308 (App. Term 1911); Leitch v.
Sanford Motor Truck Co., 279 Pa. 160, 163, 123 A. 658, 660 (1924); S. Jacobs & Sons v.
North Kensington Storage Co., 81 Pa. Super. Ct. 140, 144 (1923).
69. E.g., Nixon v. Brown, 57 N:H 34, 34 (1876).
70. See, e.g., Heath v. Stoddard, 91 Me. 499, 504, 40 A. 547, 549 (1898); Saylor Chevrolet Co. v. Ellis, 336 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, no writ); Pickering v. Busk,
104 Eng. Rep. 758, 760-61 (K.B. 1812).
71. See generally 2 S. WLXISTON, supra note 22, § 317.
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The issues in these disputes are the same as in any owner/purchaser dispute, and the courts should approach them in the same
way: the courts should decide whether it is fairer or more efficient
to allocate the loss to the true owner or to the bailee. To say simply that the true owner wins because no person may be deprived of
property without consent is to miss the point entirely, just as it
misses the point to say that the bailee's lien is good against the
whole world. Rather, the result should turn on those facts which
courts long ago identified as relevant in true owner/good faith
purchase disputes-facts which bear on the relative culpability of
the owner and the bailee or on the economic efficiency of allocating
responsibility to one party rather than the other.
In Yorke, Lord Holt would have denied the lien to a bailee
who had no duty to accept the chattel for storage. 2 He struck a
balance between security of property and good faith purchase. By
rejecting good faith purchase protection for a bailee who is not
under a duty to store, Holt supported security of property. By invoking the protection for a bailee who is under a duty to store, he
made an economic point. Had he insisted on security of property,
as the Michigan court did in Fitch,7s bailees would act at their
peril. They could accept goods from a bailor without authority or
they could investigate the bailor's authority. Either decision would
prove costly. The bailee who accepts goods from a bailor who is not
authorized to store them loses its lien. The bailee who investigates
the authority of its bailors increases the cost of its services. Ultimately, in a free market the customers of the industry will bear
that cost. Thus a security of property rule in Yorke would have
protected true owners at the expense of all who travel and store
goods, and the court's decision in favor of the lien was a decision to
allocate the cost to true owners whose stolen goods the bailee
stored.
There are two justifications for this result. First, the bailee in
Yorke had stored a horse.7 4 Thus the owner benefitted from the
72.
73.

92 Eng. Rep. at 80.
1 Doug. at 18.

74. In the 16th century, the law fashioned a unique set of rules to protect the true
owners of horses. Horses, for example, did not come within the broad good faith purchase
rule of market overt. See An Act Against the Buying of Stolen Horses, 1555, 2 Phil. & M. ,
.7, §§ 1-8; An Act to Avoid Horse Stealing, 1589, 31 Eliz. 1, C.12, § 105. Rather, the law
tended to protect the true owner. See generally 2 W. BLACKsTONi, Comr=Amas *450-51.
The result in Yorke is all the more significant, then, in light of medieval England's concern

for protecting a true owner's interest in his horse. For other early rules which protect true

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:267

storage, since the bailee kept the horse from the elements and fed
it.7" Yet the court did not rest its decision on that consideration.
The Yorke court relied on precedent which involved a carrier's lien
for shipping goods." In the carrier setting, of course, the carriage
of the goods may cause the owner to suffer expense and would justify a different rule if the court were resting the rule on an unjust
enrichment bottom. Lord Holt's analogy to the carrier case suggests strongly that the owner's benefit from the storage did not
prompt the decision."
The second justification for the Yorke result is that a true
owner and not the general public should bear the cost of storing
goods when the bailor lacks authority. That justification in turn
reflects either or both of the traditional rationales of good faith
purchase law: (1) that the true owner is more culpable for letting
the bailor get the goods than the bailee is for storing them without
title inquiry, or (2) that the true owner can prevent the losses at
less expense than the bailee can prevent them.7 a The Melenbacker
case, by permitting the bailee to assert a lien against a true owner
who entrusts, may have assumed that such entrustment should always estop the owner. In Melenbacker the bailor was the employee
of the owner and the court could have argued that the bailor had
implied or apparent authority to store the goods. That sort of analysis finds limited support in bailment cases.79 The tone of
Melenbacker, however, suggests a different rationale, namely, that
owners of horses, refer to note 44 supra.
75. 92 Eng. Rep. at 80.
76. Id.
77. The Fitch court, which confronted a carriage situation and which implicitly rejected Yorke, noted the distinction between storage and carriage as they affect the enrichment of the owner but expressly declined to use that distinction as a rationale for its decision. See Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug. 1, 9 (Mich. 1843).
78. Economists point out, of course, that these two rationales may really be one. See

generally R. PosNER, EcONOMic ANALysis op LAW 179-81 (2d ed. 1977). While that view is
persuasive, the courts have tended to distinguish the two, and this article continues that
historic and, in this case at least, harmless distinction. Advocates, of course, will always
make both arguments, for while they may not know economics, they do know human nature;
and the cases demonstrate that more courts are moved by the culpability rationale than by
the efficiency rationale.
79. See Farrell v. Harlem Terminal Storage Warehouse Co., 70 Misc. 565, 127 N.Y.S.
306 (App. Term. 1911); Knoxville Outfitting Co. v. Knoxville Fireproof Storage Co., 160
Tenn. 203, 22 S.W.2d 354 (1929); but see Finnigan v. Hadley, 286 Mass. 345, 190 N.E. 528

(1934); Zahner Mfg. Co. v. Harnish, 224 Mo. App. 870, 24 S.W.2d 641 (1930) (infering authority). Cf. U.C.C. § 7-503(1)(a), (b) (invoking an implied and apparent authority rule and
an estoppel rule). A discussion of the implications of § 7-503(1)(a) and (b) is found at the
text accompanying notes 163-94 infra.
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an owner who entrusts is either more culpable than the bailee or
better able to avoid the loss efficiently than the bailee, so that the
loss should fall on the entrusting owner. This second reading of
Melenbacker finds support not in the cases but in the Code's resolution of two disputes between owners and bailees8 0 Melenbacker,
though in conflict with Yorke, expresses a view that survives.
Yorke and Melenbacker, moreover, even though they strike
the balance at different points, stand within the bounds of good
faith purchase tradition. The cases which reject them tend to ignore those bounds, not because the courts strike the balance in a
manner different from that of Yorke and Melenbacker but because
those courts resort to property maxims without regard for the competing policies and thereby fail to find any balance.
The salient feature of this study of good faith purchase in
bailment law is that the Code adopts the pattern of the better reasoned common-law cases. Thus, the established rule commands the
balancing of security of property policy against good faith purchase
policy. Some cases, however, tend to select one of the two doctrines
without proper regard for the other. The pattern is less easy to
discern in the Code than in the pre-Code cases, yet analysis clearly
demonstrates that the pattern is there.
IV. THE
A.

UN FORM

AcT

The Statute

Section 28(b) of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act 1 provides that the lien of a warehouse shall be good against a third
party if the bailor "has been so entrusted with the possession of
the goods that a pledge of the same by him at the time of the
deposit to one who took the goods in good faith for value would
have been valid."
The language of this section, then, is the model on which Code
drafters based section 7-209(3)(a).82 The choice of similar language
80. See U.C.C. § 7-209(3)(b) (the household goods rule), § 7-307(2) (the carrier rule).
81. The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act was promulgated by its sponsors in 1906
and was adopted by all the states and various other American jurisdictions. See 3 UMoRm
LAws ANNOTATED vii, 9 (1959 & Supp. 1968).
82. A warehouseman's lien for charges and expenses under subsection (1) or a
security interest under subsection (2) is also effective against any person who so
entrusted the bailor with possession of the goods that a pledge of them by him to
a good faith purchaser for value would have been valid but is not effective against
a person as to whom the document confers no right in the goods covered by it
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in the Code is significant for two reasons. First, the language is
unmistakably good faith purchase in nature; that is, it incorporates
the long commercial-law tradition of balancing security of property
policy against good faith purchase policy. By reference to the
"pledge," the Uniform Act refuses to limit the inquiry to bailment
disputes but views the contest between the owner and the bailee as
but one more conflict between true owner and good faith purchaser. Second, because the language of section 28(b) of the Uniform Act serves as a model for section 7-209(3)(a), cases construing
the Act serve as precedent for disputes arising under the Code.88
Proper understanding of the modern statute governing the
warehouse lien, then, begins with analysis of pre-Code cases construing the Uniform Act.
B.

The Warehouse as Pledgee (Cases under the Uniform Act)

It is clear from the history of the lien concelt that the
common law viewed the lienor as a creditor. Blackstone, speaking
of the landlord's lien and the tax collector's lien, notes: "And so if
a landlord distreins goods for rent, or a parish officer for taxes,
these for a time are only a pledge in the hands of the distrainors. .. ."84 He also observed that "goods distreined for rent, or
other cause of distress . . . are in the nature of a pledge ...
"I'll

The Roman law seems to have used the same analogy."8 The Uniform Act accepted the pledge theory when it rendered the warehouse lien effective against a true owner against whom a pledge of
the goods would be valid. The implications, then, are clear: the
rights of the warehouse are analogous to the rights of a secured
creditor, and the cases which construe the Uniform Act generally
support that implication by invoking creditor analogies.
There is a second and stronger implication in the Act's use of
the term pledge, and that is that the act does not itself create good
under Section 7-503.
U.C.C. § 7-209(3)(a).
83. Section 7-209(3) "continues the rule under the prior uniform statutory provision. . . ... U.C.C. § 7-209, Comment 3; cf. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. R.A. Heintz Constr.
Co., 302 F. Supp. 958, 963 (D. Or. 1969) (cases which construe the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act are relevant in construing Code language drawn from that Act, absent plain contrary
intent).
84. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARis *452 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at *396.
86. See DIGEST 5.20.2.3.
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faith purchase rules but incorporates such rules from the law of
pledge. Again, the pre-Code cases tend to support that view.
87
In Smith's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Reliable Stores Corp.,
the court refused to subordinate the interest of a conditional seller
to the lien of a warehouse in which the buyer stored the goods.
First the court noted that the seller did not consent to the storage
and, therefore, the buyer could not subordinate the seller's interest
without "statutory"8 8 authority to the contrary. Such language
clearly implies that the court did not view the Uniform Act itself
as authority. The same court made the point more clearly in a subsequent case ' 9 which also involved a conditional seller. There the
court noted that the conditional seller failed to comply with the
filing and acknowledgement requirements of the Conditional Sales
Act. That failure distinguished the second case from the Smith
case and led the court to rule that a pledge by the buyer would
have bound the seller and accordingly that the warehouse lien
prevailed. 90
To some extent, however, other authority equivocates. One
line of New Jersey cases, a majority view it would seem, accepts
the analysis offered here," but two New Jersey opinions" reject
the pledge analogy, holding that a warehouse is not a pledgee and
therefore does not benefit from the Conditional Sales Act's provision9 s rendering an unfiled seller's interest subordinate to that of a
purchaser.
Those latter two cases appear to be aberrational. Authority
from other jurisdictions accepts the pledge analogy and renders the
lien paramount to the interest of the chattel mortgagee ° who fails
87. 58 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
88. Id. at 512.
89. Fidelity Storage Co. v. Reliable Store Corp., 69 F.2d 569 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
90. Id. at 569-70.
91. See Famous Furniture Co. v. J. Fishman & Son, 22 N.J. Misc. 368, 370, 29 A.2d
235, 236 (Clifton County Ct. 1944); Albert Lifson & Sons v. Williams, 10 NJ. Misc. 982, 984,
162 A. 129, 131 (Monmouth County Dist. Ct. 1931); cf. Bloomingdale Bros. v. Cook, 8 N.J.

Misc. 824, 827, 152 A. 666, 668 (Bergen County Dist. Ct. 1930) (accepting the theory advanced by the text but deciding against the warehouse because the conditional seller filed its

contract).
92. Jersey Security Co. v. Lottimer, 20 N.J. Misc. 432, 434, 28 A.2d 623, 625 (Hudson
County Dist. Ct. 1942); Banker's Capitol Furniture Co. v. Hall, 11 N.J. Misc. 13, 15, 163 A.
556, 557 (Monmouth County Dist. Ct. 1932).
93. See UNFoRM CoNDmoNAL SALEs AcT § 5.
94. Buckley-Newhall Co. v. Bangs, 130 Misc. 293, 224 N.Y.S. 71 (Mun. Ct. 1927). Significantly, in Buckley-Newhall there were two chattel mortgages, one filed and one not. The

court enforced the lien against the unfiled mortgage but not against the one that was
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to comply with the appropriate statute. This other authority is
consistent, moreover, with the broader line of authority which renders the warehouse lien subordinate to conditional sellers and
chattel mortgagees who do comply with the perfection requirements of the various statutes 95 and with those cases which hold
that the warehouse loses to the unfiled conditional vendor if a
state's Conditional Sales Act does not require filing.,, The pledgee
defeats a prior secured party only if that prior party has not observed the technical requirements of the appropriate statute and
thereby failed to perfect its security interest. It is significant, furthermore, that even though the New Jersey line of cases favors
creditors over the warehouse, it does so by reference to the law of
creditors, that is, it accepts the notion that the Uniform Act does
not fashion its own priority rules but defers to creditor priority
rules under other statutes.
1. The Rationale. At this point several observations are in
order. First, we see from the cases that in these disputes the parties contesting with the warehouses are persons who may think of
themselves as true owners, such as sellers who retain title under
97
the Conditional Sales Act, but whom the law regards as creditors.
With some exception, courts then view the dispute as one for applying the creditor priority rules. On occasion, however, courts
have failed to perceive the claimant as a creditor.9 8 In Leitch v.
properly filed; cf. Zahner Mfg. Co. v. Harnish, 224 Mo. App. 870, 24 S.W.2d 641 (1930)
(chattel mortgagee may authorize the storage, but absent that authority, the mortgage
defeats the warehouse lien).

95. See Buckley-Newhall Co. v. Bangs, 130 Misc. 293, 224 N.Y.S. 71 (Mun. Ct. 1927);
Ludwig Baumann & Co. v. Roth, 67 Misc. 458, 123 N.Y.S. 191 (App. Term. 1910); Holmes v.

Klein, 59 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1933, writ dism'd); First Nat'l Bank v.
White Dulaney Co., 121 Wash. 386, 209 P. 861 (1922) (dictum).
96. Dade Nat'l Bank v. University Transfer & Storage, Inc., 151 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1963); Haverty Furniture Co. v. Kennelly Moving & Storage Co., 19 Fla. Supp. 88
(Duval County Ct. 1962); Sterchi Bros. Stores v. Weaver, 163 Tenn. 499, 43 S.W.2d 489

(1931); Knoxville Outfitting Co. v. Knoxville Fireproof Storage Co., 160 Tenn. 203, 22
S.W.2d 354 (1929).

97. The Code accepts the metamorphosis. Section 2-401(1) stipulates that "[a]ny retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to
the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest."
98. The Leitch and Jacobs cases discussed in the text are not atypical. I have dis.
cussed elsewhere the unfortunate tendency of courts to neglect this distinction between one
who is an owner and one who is a secured party. See generally Dolan, U.C.C. Framework,
supra note 15. As cases in that article demonstrate, jurists still have difficulty with the
distinction. Id. at 847-52. Not all jurists have difficulty with it, however. See, e.g., Putterbaugh v. Fournier (In re Happy Jack's Restaurant, Inc.), 29 U.C.C. REP. SzRV. 653, 657-

59 (D. Me. 1980).
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Sanford Motor Truck Co.,9 9 for example, a truck manufacturer
under "bailment lease" delivered trucks to a dealer who "gave"' 0 0
one of them to his bank as collateral. The bank, in turn, stored the
truck with a warehouse that asserted its lien against the manufacturer. The court, however, favored the manufacturer and rejected
the warehouse's argument that delivery to the dealer should estop
the manufacturer.
The error in Leitch stems from the failure to perceive the
manufacturer not as an owner but as a creditor and the delivery
arrangment not as a "bailment lease" but as a disguised conditional sale or chattel mortgage.
Given a true lease, of course, courts may well regard the claimant as an owner. In Jacobs v. North Kensington Storage Co.,"0 ' for
instance, the claimant leased a player piano to the bailor who
stored it with the defendant warehouse. The court ruled in favor of
the lessor/owner, holding that "mere possession" 10 2 by the bailor
was insufficient to make the lien good against the warehouse. That
conclusion may be justifiable from a good faith purchase standpoint, but only if the claimant is indeed a lessor. If the lease is a
disguised credit sale, then the claimant is a creditor, 0 3 and priority
over the lien depends upon perfection.
The second observation to make after review of cases under
the Uniform Act relates to good faith purchase itself. We have seen
that some cases are true to the apparent intent of the statute;
others are not.1 ' To what extent do good faith purchase considerations support the cases?
By and large good faith purchase analysis supports the cases
which follow the apparent intent of the statute, but the analysis
suggests a new rationale for good faith purchase. The traditional
paths of good faith purchase inquiry are culpability and economic
efficiency. Under the first we determine which of the two parties
(the balor's creditor or the warehouse) is more culpable for the
loss. We could say, for example, that a conditional seller who fails
to file the sales contract is blameworthy for hiding the interest and
99. 279 Pa. 160, 123 A. 658 (1924).
100. Id. at 162, 123 A. at 659.
101. 81 Pa. Super. Ct. 140 (1923).
102. Id. at 144.

103. The Code explicitly accepts the idea that a lease-purchase which in reality is a
credit arrangement merits treatment as a security agreement subject to the Secured Transactions Article. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(1)(a).
104. Refer to notes 87-102 supra and accompanying text.
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preventing the warehouse from finding it. On the other hand, if the
conditional seller files and the warehouse fails to find the filing, the
105
warehouse is blameworthy.

Both of these arguments fair poorly, however, by efficiency
standards. The fact is that warehouses do not look for filings,100
and to reward them when the bailors' creditors fail to file and penalize them when the creditors do is to examine the conduct of the
creditor and ignore the conduct of the warehouse. Why is a creditor who fails to file any more blameworthy than a warehouse which
fails to search, and why should the creditor who fails to file always
lose and the warehouse which fails to search win or lose depending
on the conduct of the creditor? The culpability rationale, then,
makes sense only if warehouses search, which they never do.
At first blush the economic efficiency route is no more convincing. It is true that it costs less for the creditor to file than for
the warehouse to determine ownership, but a rule which favors the
filing creditor and disfavors the nonfiling creditor also indulges in
the fiction that the warehouses search for filings. It rewards an act
which costs less than warehouse title searches would cost if there
were no filing, but it is still a useless act. Warehouses do not
search. The warehouse will store the goods (and thereby ensure in
some cases that somebody suffers a loss) whether the creditor files
or not. Thus, under this economic approach and the culpability
approach, we must resort to fictions in order to complete the
equation.
There remains, however, a modified economic analysis which
justifies invoking good faith purchase protection when the creditor
fails to perfect. Perfection rules provide a clear benchmark for separating those cases in which the warehouse wins from those in
which the creditor wins, and, more importantly, they protect the
integrity of the filing system by promoting perfection, that is, by
encouraging creditors to perfect. Even though bailees do not search
105. Some courts seem to adopt this rationale in holding that the filing is constructive
notice to the warehouse. See Ludwig Baumann & Co. v. Roth, 67 Misc. 458, 460, 123 N.Y.S.
191, 192 (Sup. Ct. 1910); cf. Holloway v. Merchants' Transfer Co., 294 S.W. 989, 990 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1927, no writ) (warehouse should search the records if it knows the bailor
is not the true owner).
106. It is absurd to expect the warehouse to check for filings. The cost would be prohibitive. The law created a fiction when it treated the warehouse as a pledgee, but the law
should not slavishly follow that fiction and assume that the warehouse behaves as a pledgee
behaves. But cf. RESTATEMENT Op SECURITY § 76, Comment a (1941) (suggests that the recording statutes assure a warehouse that it can learn of prior interests).
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for filings, other creditors do, and the law is properly concerned
with the filing system. Thus the cases which resort to creditor priority rules satisfy the good faith purchase test. They promote a
socially desirable end-an efficient filing system.
Those cases, furthermore, that fail to perceive correctly the
nature of the claimant and confuse lessors with creditors cannot
pursue the good faith purchase inquiry properly. If we accept the
thesis of this article that good faith purchase doctrine is essentially
efficiency analysis, proper understanding of the roles the parties
play is indispensable to that analysis.
In the Leitch case, for example, the characterization of the
manufacturer's act determines the result. The court's acceptance
of the manufacturer's delivery of trucks to the dealer as a "bailment lease" promotes security of property treatment. As we have
seen, the law tends to protect a person who "merely" delivers
goods. Owners should feel free to leave their goods with a third
person without fear of being deprived of their title, which cannot
pass from them without their consent.11° Yet when we view the
conduct of truck manufacturers in the full commercial context, we
recognize the heavy commercial cost of invoking such a rule. If the
truck manufacturers may deliver goods to dealers and may defeat
good faith creditors of the dealers, such creditors will compute the
cost of such losses into the price they charge for such credit. If, on
the other hand, we characterize the manufacturers as creditors of
the dealers and invoke the perfection rules against them, they will
compute the cost of perfecting their interests in their prices. In
either event, of course, the consumer will pay the cost, but in the
latter, common sense tells us that the cost will be less. It costs less
to file than it costs to guard against unfiled interests.
2. Consumers. The same analysis applies to the Jacobs
case. If the lease of the player piano was a disguised credit sale, we
must decide whether the seller should observe the customary filing
rules. The Code concludes that it need not. 0 8 Why do we have one
rule for truck manufacturers and another for piano retailers? The
answer lies in the commercial realities of consumer financing. Because the creditor/seller of consumer goods need not file, it will
107. Note, however, that the Code does not accept such a security of property argument when the true owner entrusts to one in the business of selling goods of the kind. See
U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
108. The code excuses a purchase money seller of consumer goods from the filing requirements of Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d).
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defeat most purchasers. Section 9-306(2) provides that the security
interest follows the goods into the hands of a purchaser. Will those
purchasers not have to compute the cost of losses from such hidden security interests and will such costs not exceed the costs of
requiring the creditor to file? The Code concludes that with two
exceptions the answer is no. First, owners of consumer goods generally do not sell them, except perhaps to a neighbor. They may
give them away; they may store them; they may grant a lender a
security interest in them, though such security interests are commercially insignificant.
If they give the goods away, the donees take subject to the
security interest. 10 9 There is no valid commercial reason to protect
the donees. They do not "lose" anything in the commercial sense if
they have to return the gift. If the consumers sell the goods to
neighbors, however, the neighbors would lose in the commercial
sense if they take subject to the security interest. The Code, therefore, protects the neighbors by rendering the sale free of the unfiled security interest.1 1 0 In this instance the cost of filing is arguably less than the potential cost to the buyer. In the third example,
where the consumer stores the goods, the household goods rule of
section 7-209(3)(b) protects the warehouse. Here the Code concludes that the commercial benefit of ready access to the warehouse exceeds the cost of subjecting the seller to the warehouse
lien.
On the other hand, the Code does not look with favor on the
practice of granting non-purchase-money security interests in consumer goods. Creditors taking such an interest will not defeat the
purchase-money lender who enjoys a secret lien."" In general the
Code does not view non-purchase-money security interests in consumer goods as an important source of credit"'2 and is, therefore,
109. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
110. In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of a security interest even
though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security interest, for value
and for his own personal, family or household purposes unless prior to the
purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement covering such goods.
U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
111. The purchase-money seller of consumer goods, of course, perfects without filing.

U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d). The later, non-purchase-money lender must file. Id. § 9-302(1). The
filing, however, postdates the perfection of the seller's unfiled security interest. Thus under
the general priority rule, the seller enjoys priority. See id. § 9-312(5)(a).
112. For additional evidence of the Code's antipathy toward non-purchase-money security interests in consumer goods, see U.C.C. § 9-204(2), which interdicta attachment of a
security interest in most after-acquired consumer goods and which is an exception to the
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willing to let such secured transactions bear the cost of losses
caused by a rule favoring the earlier unfiled purchase-money
interest' 13
This brief sally into the Code rules relating to consumer goods
demonstrates again the commercial law's facility with good faith
purchase, which the Code uses or withholds as a means of supporting or inhibiting commercial practices. The analysis also demonstrates the context in which the household goods rule of section 7209(3)(b) operates. Reference to that context is essential to an understanding of the household goods rule itself.
C. The Evicting Constable
There are a number of cases under the Uniform Act which relate to forcible detainer actions-an area that still provides a
source for litigation. The setting generally begins with an action by
the owner of real estate against a defaulting tenant. When the
owner obtains a judgment granting it possession of the premises, it
customarily obtains a writ of restitution, which directs a court officer to remove the tenants and their goods from the premises. 11' If
the tenants are absent or contumacious, the sheriff will store the
goods rather than discard them or leave them in the street. Later
the tenant will claim them, and the warehouse will assert its lien.
The statutes of some jurisdictions anticipated the tenant's argument that the lien is not good against the nonconsenting owner,115
but most jurisdictions left the matter to the courts. One court
found the authority to store the goods implicit in the tenant's leavgeneral Code rule favoring the use of after-acquired property as collateral. See id. § 9204(1), (2).
113. Some might be tempted to see these consumer goods rules as efforts at consumer
protection against overreaching creditors. Non-purchase-money security interests have
sometimes arisen out of "sharp" lender practices. Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (court held unconscionable the extensive use of cross
collateralization by retail seller). The more accurate view, however, would seem to be that
which characterizes these Code rules as neutral in the consumer protection struggle. As Professor White has pointed out, a rule against the lender may increase the cost of credit. See
White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 WIS. L
Rav. 513-26. More persuasive, then, than the notion of consumer protection, is the idea that
the Code views protection of non-purchase-money security interests in consumer goods as
sufficiently unimportant to require the purchase-money lender to file.
114. See, e.g., MICH. Com. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5744 (West Supp. 1980).
115. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 239, § 4 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-7-2093(c) (Supp. 1979). Refer to note 211 infra.
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ing them after defaulting on the lease.""0 A second case, however,
suggested that because the warehouse knows the bailor is not the
true owner, the warehouse should at least search for filings.117 A
third case, Smith v. Kathrens Moving & Storage Co.," 8 denied the
lien when an attaching creditor caused the sheriff to store goods
but thereafter failed to file the necessary attachment bond, while a
fourth, Treasurerand Receiver General v. Tremont Storage Warehouse, Inc.," 9 enforced the warehouse lien against the owner of
goods who was not the judgment debtor.
In short, these cases decided under the Uniform Act'20 display
a marked degree of confusion. In the Smith case, for example, the
court looked closely at the language of the Act and concluded that
it did not embrace situations in which the sheriff bailed goods pursuant to a writ of restitution.' 2' That conclusion is reasonable
enough, but it reflects the traditional reluctance of courts to fashion a rule to fill the hiatus in the statute. Given good faith
purchase analysis, it is difficult to support the Smith result. If the
legislature, as the Missouri legislature did, permits attachment of
goods, that is, permits the creditor to deprive the owner of possession without posting a bond, the Smith decision makes little sense.
The warehouse lien should stand or fall regardless of whether the
creditor makes the bond or not, for the existence of that bond does
not render the conduct of the warehouse (or the true owner) any
less or more culpable and does not bear on efficiency analysis. The
problem in Smith was that the legislature permitted attachment
without bond. Certainly, in such cases the debtor should be able to
recover any losses from the creditor, but to put the cost of storage
on the warehouse will only increase the cost of storing goods in all
instances, because the warehouse will be forced to compute the
risk cost into its price. The public ultimately will bear the cost
under the Smith rule for mistakes of the judgment creditor.
Holloway v. Merchants' Transfer Co.'2 ' displays similar confusion. In Holloway the court fashioned a rule requiring the warehouse to search for filings when a court official stored goods pursu116.
117.
1927, no
118.
119.
120.

Finnigan v. Hadley, 286 Mass. 345, 347-48, 190 N.E. 528, 529 (1934).
Holloway v. Merchants' Transfer Co., 294 S.W. 989, 990 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
writ).
236 Mo. App. 921, 163 S.W.2d 128 (1942).
296 Mass. 531, 6 N.E.2d 838 (1937).
UNIFORM WAREHOUsE REcEnts AcT.

121. 236 Mo. App. at 929, 163 S.W.2d at 131-32.
122. 294 S.W. 989 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1927, no writ).

19811

GOOD FAITH PURCHASE

ant to a judgment in a forcible detainer action. The Holloway
decision follows the general rule that the warehouse must search,
and we might accept its results on the grounds that the increase in
storage costs it mandates are offset by the savings realized by the
judicial efficiency it fosters. The Holloway opinion, however, suggests a different rationale. First, the judgment in forcible detainer
was entered against both the chattel mortgagee and the chattel
mortgagor. The creditor could hardly argue that it was blameless
or that it was costlier for it to protect itself than it was for the
warehouse to determine ownership. Second, and more important, is
the tone of the opinion which supports a reading that would disfavor the warehouse lien even when the claimant has no interest of
record. The Holloway case implies that it is the duty of the warehouse to inquire when a public official stores goods which obviously belong to a third party. 2 3
More persuasive is Finniganv. Hadley,124 which infers authority to store from the tenant's conduct. By leaving the goods after
defaulting on a lease which authorized the lessor to remove the
tenant in case of default, the tenant, who also did not leave notice
of his whereabouts, impliedly authorized the lessor to store the
goods. 12 5 Any other decision in Finnigan,of course, would have left
the creditor without any remedy unless he was willing to pay to
store the tenant's goods or run the risk of the conversion liability
that the tenant would surely assert if the lessor moved the goods to
the sidewalk.
These attachment and forcible detainer cases, then, display
the confusion one would expect when courts confront an area of
undeveloped theory. In such situations we inevitably find ad hoc
jurisprudence with its attendant inconsistencies. Good faith
purchase analysis provides the theoretical tether. It suggests that
good faith purchase treatment for the warehouse yields a more efficient and fairer rule.
This discussion of the forcible detainer cases reveals one further and significant implication. The official version of the Code
has breached the theoretical lacuna of the Uniform Act. Under the
Uniform Act, as we have seen, the courts were at sea. The court
officer's conduct of storing goods did not fit the "pledge" paradigm
123. Id. at 990.
124. 286 Mass. 345, 190 N.E. 528 (1934).
125. Id. at 348, 190 N.E. at 529.
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of the Act, and inconsistent lines of authority resulted. Under section 7-209(3)(b) of the Code, however, the constable has the authority to store household goods: the warehouse lien will survive,
and warehouses will accept such goods at126lower prices than those
the Uniform Act's confusion would yield.

Thus, two obvious questions remain: do constables have authority if the goods are not household goods, and, more significantly, do they have such authority in the many jurisdictions that
have not adopted section 7-209(3)(b)? The good faith purchase
analysis offered here suggests that the answer to both questions
should be yes. Courts should be willing to extend the rule in the
interest of commercial efficiency. As cases under the Uniform Act
and the Code itself indicate 1 27 however, many courts do not accept
that analysis. In such courts lawyers for true owners should therefore raise the question whether the lien is good against the defaulting tenant. It is curious, however, that at a time when advocates
for the poor are challenging such liens,128 they have ignored this
argument (despite its history of partial success) in favor of arguments challenging the constitutionality of the Code's lien provisions 1 29 a challenge which faces obstacles far more formidable than
good faith purchase theory.13 0
126. A warehouseman's lien on household goods for charges and expenses in relation to the goods under subsection (1) is also effective against all persons if the
depositor was the legal possessor of the goods at the time of deposit. "Household
goods" means furniture, furnishings and personal effects used by the depositor in
a dwelling.
U.C.C. § 7-209(3)(b).
127. See Nikolas v. Patrick, 51 Mich. App. 561, 215 N.W.2d 715 (1974); Cordle v. Lincoln Moving & Storage, Inc., 10 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1204 (Neb. Dist. Ct. 1976); Disch v.
Raven Transfer & Storage Co., 17 Wash. App. 73, 561 P.2d 1097 (1977). These cases are
discussed in text accompanying notes 195-216 infra.
128. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Cox Bakeries of N.D., Inc. v.
Timm Moving & Storage, Inc., 554 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1977); Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d
802 (9th Cir. 1976); Wegwart v. Eagle Movers, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Wis. 1977);
Svendsen v. Smith's Moving & Trucking Co., 29 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 609 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980).
129. The challenge, of course, is directed not at § 7-209(3) but at § 7-210, which permits the warehouse to satisfy the lien by selling the goods. Refer to note 128 supra.
130. It is not the subject of this article to speculate on the reasons for that apparent
oversight, but an analogous and even more significant phenomenon in the practice of commercial law bears mention. For some time now, consumer advocates have been challenging
repossession and resale practices permitted secured lenders under provisions in Article 9
that parallel the warehouse lien provisions of Article 7. Compare U.C.C. §§ 7-209, .210 with
§§ 9-503, -504. Those challenges were nearly always unsuccessful. See, e.g., Gibbs v.
Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Brantley v.
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D. Additional Considerations
There remain a number of cases which were decided under the
Uniform Act and which reflect concerns not evident in the cases
discussed thus far. These cases serve to define the boundaries of
good faith purchase.
1. The Thief Rule. There has always been a limit on the doctrine of good faith purchase to the effect that a thief cannot pass
good title, even to a bona fide purchaser. 31 There are, of course,
exceptions to that rule for property to which the law affords the
highest degree of negotiability. 13 2 Goods do not fall into any of

those exceptions, and the cases which hold that the warehouse lien
does not extend to goods stolen from their owner are true to that
general rule.13 3 Thus, when a husband steals into the home of his
Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974);
Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); Bowman v. Chrysler Credit
Corp., 496 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Bichel Optical Labs., Inc. v. Marquette
Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973); Giglio v. Bank of DeL, 307 A.2d 816 (Del. Ch.
1973); Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973); Brown v. United
States Natl Bank, 265 Or. 234, 509 P.2d 442 (1973); Sandoval v. American Nat'l Bank, 517
P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1973).
The significant point is that in many of these cases the plaintiff could have pursued a
nonconstitutional argument with some likelihood of success. Section 9-503 permits repossession by the secured lender only by proceeding "without breach of the peace." Now that the
bloom is off the constitutional rose, advocates for debtors may resort to this provision,
which has enjoyed a modicum of success. See, e.g., Walker v. Walthall, 121 Ariz, 121, 588
P.2d 863 (1978) (presence of uniformed deputy during repossession constitutes breach of the
peace); Deavers v. Standridge, 144 Ga. App. 673, 242 S.E.2d 331 (1978) (abusive language is
breach of the peace); Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d 683 (1970)
(repossession over debtor's representative's objections is breach of the peace); Harris v.
Cantwell, 47 Or. App. 211, 614 P.2d 124 (1980) (verbal altercation between debtor and police officer who was assisting in the repossession raises a question of fact whether there was
a breach of the peace); Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler, 1 Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651 (1970)
(presence of uniformed sheriff is breach of the peace).
131. Thus, for example, a thief may not give good title to a purchaser of a negotiable
document of title even if the holder takes by due negotiation. See U.C.C. § 7-503, Comment
1; see generally 2 S. WE.LsToN, supra note 22, § 311. Refer to notes 44 and 74 supra.
132. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-202(1), 7-501(1), 8-302(1) (Code rules which permit negotiation by delivery).
133. It is significant that some commercial lawyers read the 1952 version of the Code
as making the warehouse lien good against a true owner even if the bailor was a thief. See
N.Y.L. REVISION CoMmissIoN REP., REPORT AND APPENDICES RELATING TO TIlE UNIFOIaP COMMERCIL CODE 708, 731, 759, 777, 786-87, 796 (1956); 3 N.Y. L. REvISioN Co0 TaSSiON REP.,
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCM CODE 1800 (1955). The comment disputed such a reading. See U.C.C. § 7-209(3) & Comment 2 (1952 version).
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estranged wife and removes and stores furniture which she claims,
the warehouse may not assert a lien against the goods.134 This denial of good faith purchase treatment has its roots in the security
of property principle that no person may be deprived of property
and that the policy against rewarding theft outweighs the policy of
fostering commercial activity. Significantly, however, both the
common lawl 5 and the Code136 give the bailee a lien against the
owner of stolen goods where the law imposes a duty on that bailee
to accept the goods.137
2. Entrustment. Difficulty arises when the owner does not
lose the goods to a thief but delivers them to one who exceeds his
authority and bails the goods. Generally the common law held that
mere entrustment by' the owner and possession by the bailor was
not enough."3 " Good faith purchase inquiry is the process of determining what in addition to entrustment is necessary to cut off the
owner's interest.139 Does, for example, the delivery of goods to a
warehouse authorize the warehouse to rebail the goods? As it does
in the forcible detainer cases, the "pledge" paradigm of the Uniform Act fails here. Warehouses and constables are not in the business of pledging goods and their conduct does not fit the pledge
model well. Good faith purchase considerations support a rule,
however, which facilitates storage by the constable and also support a rule which facilitates restorage by a warehouse.
The latter situation arises, presumably, when the first warehouse is running out of space or going out of business. In either
event it seems commercially reasonable to expect the first warehouse to notify the bailor before rebailing the goods, or it seems
commercially reasonable for the second warehouse when con134. Young v. Colyear, 54 Cal. App. 232, 201 P. 623 (1921).
135. See, e.g., Yorke v. Grenaugh, 92 Eng. Rep. 79, 80 (K.B. 1703). Refer to text accompanying notes 42-54 supra.
136. See U.C.C. § 7-307(2).
137. See id.
138. E.g., Farrell v. Harlem Terminal Storage Warehouse Co., 70 Misc. 565, 127 N.Y.S.
306 (App. Term 1911).
139. Sometimes entrustment itself is sufficient if the owner knows that the entrustee
will require a bailee's services, and if those services enhance the value of the goods. In England the courts fashioned a common-law rule in favor of the garageman's lien by inferring
the authority of a hire purchaser who would need to have taxicabs serviced. See Albemarle
Supply Co. v. Hind & Co., [1928] 1 K.B. 307 (C.A.). In the United States, the matter was
generally governed by statute, but Professor Williston characterized the theory as one of
ostensible ownership, not implied authority. 1 S. WLLisToN & G. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 277, at 804 (rev. ed. 1936).
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fronted with this situation to notify the owner. To require the two
warehouses to wait for directions, however, is not commercially realistic. Often persons store goods because they are travelling or will
be in distant places. Often bailors do not respond to requests for
instructions. The cost of holding goods in the first warehouse until
all persons respond would be significant. There is, furthermore, lit/ tle benefit to the owner in such a rule. Presumably the identity of
the warehouse makes little difference to the owner. General contract principles give the owner a cause of action against the first
warehouse if the move increases the owner's charges. That cause of
action should be enough protection. Certainly, there is inconvenience and perhaps expense to the bailor whose goods are rebailed,
but that inconvenience and expense cannot outweigh the general
inconvenience and expense to the industry and its customers of a
rule which inhibits rebailment. In short, commercial exigencies and
the difficulties of obtaining the owners' consent suggest that good
faith purchase should sanction the second bailment. The cases,
however, fail to pursue the good faith purchase analysis and hold
against the second bailee. 140
We see that the thief rule limits application of good faith
purchase in the face of historic commitment to the notion that a
thief cannot deprive the owner of title. In the entrustment situations, we sometimes apply the rule, sometimes not; that is, we analyze the sitution and exercise good faith purchase as a prerogative.
There remains a third feature of the bailment contest that merits
discussion.
3. The Special-GeneralLien Distinction.At common law"
and by statute142 the warehouse enjoys both a special and a general
lien. The special lien protects the warehouse with respect to
charges that relate to the goods stored. The general lien protects
140. See Nikolas v. Patrick, 51 Mich. App. 561, 215 NAV.2d 715 (1974) (a case decided

under the Code); Farrell v. Harlem Terminal Storage Warehouse Co., 70 Misc. 565. 127
N.Y.S. 306 (App. Term 1911). Cf. U.C.C. § 7-206 (permitting a warehouse to terminate the

storage contract but making no provision for rebailment).
141.
142.

See generally J. KENT, Com~marAuEs *634.
Section 7-209(1) describes the special lien, and then adds:

If the person on whose account the goods are held is liable for like charges or
expenses in relation to other goods whenever deposited and it is stated in the
receipt that a lien is claimed for charges and expenses in relation to other goods,
the warehouseman also has a lien against him for such charges and expenses
whether or not the other goods have been delivered by the warehouseman.
U.C.C. § 7-209(1).
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the warehouse with respect to charges arising out of the storage of
other goods.
In disputes between the true owner and the warehouse, courts
have tended to treat the two liens differently. 143 In Chemical National Bank v. New York Dock Co.,1 44 for example, the bank took
documents of title when it honored a letter of credit. It then asked
its customer, the buyer of the goods, for reimbursement. The buyer
being unable to pay, the bank entrusted the goods to the buyer
with instructions to store and sell them for the bank's account.
The buyer stored them with a warehouse. Upon the buyer's bankruptcy the warehouse claimed a lien on the goods to cover not only
the cost of their storage but also the storage costs
for other goods;
145
that is, the warehouse asserted a general lien.
The court rejected the general lien argument by noting that
the bank was the owner 1 " of the goods, 41 that the buyer had no
authority to pledge them, and, therefore, that the Uniform Act did
not give the warehouse a lien good against the "owner.

14 8

Signifi-

cantly, however, the bank and the court assumed that the special
lien was good, and that the bank must pay storage charges relating
to the goods in dispute. Similary, In re Taub149 involved a bank
which asserted an interest in goods for which its bankrupt customer failed to pay. In Taub, however, the warehouse issued the
receipts directly to the bank, and the court held that since the
warehouse was aware of the bank's interest, the warehouse could
not assert a general lien against the goods. 150
Good faith purchase analysis supports both the Chemical National Bank and Taub results. In neither instance is there any jus143. For a general discussion of general liens and evidence of the common law's reluctance to enforce them, see Lord Mansfield's opinion in Green v. Farmer, 98 Eng. Rep. 154
(K.B. 1768). Kent noted that general liens "are looked at with jealousy, because they encroach upon the common law and destroy the equal distribution of the debtor's estate
among his creditors." 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *636.
144. 203 A.D. 108, 196 N.Y.S. 414 (1922), aff'd per curiam, 236 N.Y. 560, 142 N.E. 283
(1923).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 112, 196 N.Y.S. at 418.
147. Under the Code it is more accurate to characterize the issuer of a letter of credit
who takes documents of title as a secured party rather than an owner. See U.C.C. §§ 9102(1)(a), -202; but cf. U.C.C. § 7-502(1)(b) (which gives the bank "title" to the goods);
Hendries, Inc. v. American Express Co., 35 A.D.2d 412, 316 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1970) (the bank,
having title to the goods, defeats a purported buyer in ordinary course).
148. 203 A.D. at 112, 196 N.Y.S. at 418.
149. 7 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1925).
150. Id. at 451.
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tification for ruling for the warehouse. Neither fairness nor economic consideration dictates such a result. The fact is that while a
warehouse may reasonably rely on the bailor's possession of goods
in accepting them for storage, and therefore extend value, the
value extended in such reliance relates only to the goods stored.5 1
Considerations of fairness support the warehouse only to the extent of its special lien.
Economic considerations support the same conclusion. The
cost to the warehouse in taking the goods does not exceed the storage charges, and by protecting the special lien, the courts protect
the warehouse against that cost. To protect its general lien would
be to give the warehouse a windfall. By the same token, while we
are willing to allocate to the owner the cost of the unauthorized
storage of the owner's goods, it makes no sense to allocate to the
owner charges arising out of the storage of other goods, especially
when such allocation would afford the warehouse a windfall. The
cost imbalance would be too great if we extend good faith protec52
tion to the general lien.
This analysis poses questions in interpreting the Code's lien
provisions. The bill of lading rule clearly accepts the cost analysis
by limiting the lien to charges "subsequent to the date of. . .receipt of the goods. . . .1

There remains room, of course, for the

possibility that a carrier will argue that the Code only interdicts
application of a general lien when it relates to charges incurred
before storage of the goods. That distinction makes good faith
purchase sense if carriers generally rely on one shipment as security for charges out of a later shipment. There is no evidence of
such reliance, ' " and it is probably safe to conclude that the Code
rightly abolishes the general lien for carriers.""
151. The text assumes that the warehouse does not release goods stored earlier in reliance on the bailor's possession and storage of goods subject to a third party's claim. As the
negative implication in the text suggests, in the event of such a release, good faith purchase
analysis might support the general lien claim. A better rule would require the warehouse to
take a security interest in the bailed goods to cover the debt arising out of other storage.
Such a security interest would qualify for good faith purchase treatment only if the warehouse obtains a signed security agreement. See U.C.C. § 7-209(2) & Comment 2.
152. Lord Mansfield would agree. See Green v. Farmer, 98 Eng. Rep. 154 (K.B. 1768).
153. U.C.C. § 7-307(1).
154. "[S]ince carriers do not commonly claim a lien for charges in relation to other
goods... provisions for a general lien. . . are omitted." U.C.C. § 7-307, Comment.
155. But cf.U.C.C. § 7-105 (the omission from the special provisions in Article 7 for
carriers of a corresponding provision in the special provisions for warehouses "does not imply that a corresponding rule of law is not applicable"). The comment suggests, however,
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The Code, however, does not abolish the general lien for the
warehouse. Section 7-209(1) clearly contemplates it,150 and the language of section 7-209(3) makes no distinction between the special
and general lien when defining the good faith purchase protection
for the warehouse against the true owner. 5 7 Thus, the warehouse
lien section harbors problems for the view of this article that, absent the bailee's reliance and detriment, general liens do not merit
good faith purchase treatment. In fact, under closer analysis those
implications fade. Subsection 7-209(3)(a) makes no distinction between special and general liens, but the section itself does not
make a good faith purchase rule. Rather, as the Uniform Act did,
subsection 7-209(3)(a) incorporates the law of pledge. The law of
pledge, moreover, is malleable. It responds to good faith purchase
concerns, and there is no reason that courts construing the Code
could not limit the pledge rule as the Chemical NationalBank and
Taub courts did. In those cases the courts held in effect that the
owners "so entrusted the bailor with possession of the goods that a
pledge of them by him to a good faith purchaser for value would
have been valid . . .,,158 but they would protect the warehouse
only to the extent of its special lien.1 59 As to the general lien, the

courts refused to invoke a good faith purchase result. The apparent inconsistency stems from the good faith purchase analysis described earlier 60 and stands on the fact that to give the warehouse
a general lien is to give the warehouse a windfall. The value the
warehouse advances by storing the goods thus serves a discrete
purpose: it is value for the special lien but not the general. 01
that § 7-105 refers to the possibility of a carrier's taking a security interest, not a general
lien. Id., Comment.
156. Refer to note 142 supra.
157. Refer to note 82 supra.
158. U.C.C. § 7-209(3)(a).
159. It is questionable that the law of pledge would favor the warehouse in the Chemi-

cal National Bank and Taub cases. Under the Code the claimant in both cases hold a perfected security interest in the goods stored. In Chemical the bank took a trust receipt from
the bailor. If the bank filed, its security interest was perfected, and unless the facts sup.
ported and the court accepted an agency or estoppel theory, the law of "pledge" would favor
the perfected secured party over the later pledgee. Similarly, the claimant in Taub hold a
nonnegotiable warehouse receipt isued in its name and was, therefore, perfected. Cf. U.C.C.
§ 9-304(3) (a secured party may perfect a security interest in goods held by a bailee who
issued a nonnegotiable receipt for them by having the receipt issue in the name of the secured party). The results would be the same under the Code as under "pledge" rules. The
Code gives a perfected secured party priority over a later pledgee. See id. § 9-312(5)(a).
160. Refer to notes 151-52 supra and accompanying text.
161. It is a general principle of good faith purchase doctrine that courts will not men-
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To summarize, we see in these three good faith purchase situations two in which the good faith purchase shelter does not apply
and one in which it does. In the first, we deny shelter to one who
takes from a thief not because good faith purchase analysis dictates the result but because the policy against theft overrides good
faith purchase. In the first instance we resort to security of prop10 2
erty and hold that a "stream can rise no higher than its source.
In the second we measure the cost of a security of property rule
and the cost to the buyer of storage in a strange warehouse against
the exigencies of the situation and decide on good faith purchase.
We find entrustment alone sufficient in the double bailment cases,
because it is more efficient there to protect the warehouse when its
bailor is itself a commercial bailee. In the third case, that of the
general lien, we use the good faith purchase test again and, finding
no reason to favor the warehouse which does not give value in reliance, deny good faith purchase.
This discussion of the limits of good faith purchase treatment
of the warehouse lien completes the general analysis and permits
us to move now to discussion of the section 7-503 reference in the
lien section and to an evaluation of cases decided under the Code.
V.

THE ROLE OF SECTION 7-503

The Code's plan for balancing the true owner's interest against
the warehouse lien does not end with the reference in section 7209(3) (a) to the pledge rule of the Uniform Act, for the section also
warns that the lien "is not effective against a person as to whom
the document confers no rights in the goods covered by it under
Section 7-503. '1e That reference carries heavy implications. It suggests that a whole range of good faith purchase considerations not
included in case law under the Uniform Act should be included
sure value: a buyer who takes for value in good faith generally need not justify the price
paid in order to benefit from the shelter of good faith purchase. It is the general principle
that the buyer takes the whole bargain even though the price may not be commercially
reasonable, although an unreasonably low price may indicate bad faith. See, e.g., Hollis v.
Chamberlin, 243 Ark. 201, 419 S.W.2d 116 (1967) (low purchase price suggests bad faith).
See generally U.C.C. § 1-201 (44) (definition of "value"). The view advanced here that the
courts should treat the special and general liens differently is consistent with the traditional
approach to value as a feature of good faith purchase law. So long as we treat the special
and general liens as discrete, it is compatible with traditional good faith purchase teachings
to afford shelter for one lien and not for the other.
162. Barthelness v. Cavalier, 2 Cal. App. 2d 477, 487, 38 P.2d 484, 490 (1934).
163. U.C.C. § 7-209(3)(a).
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under the Code rule. In fact, that reference to section 7-503 broadens good faith shelter for the warehouse considerably and is a significant departure from the rule of the Uniform Act as defined by
pre-Code cases. This conclusion, however, is not readily apparent.
It depends upon careful analysis of section 7-503, and it rests on
the premises that any other reading would render the reference redundant and that such a conclusion serves commercial needs.
Section 7-503(1) defines a necessary corollary of the security of
property doctrine1 64-the paramount rights rule. Analysis of that
rule begins with section 7-502, which stipulates that one who takes
a negotiable document of title by due negotiation takes title to the
document, title to the goods covered by the instrument, and rights
arising out of agency and estoppel.10 5 In short, section 7-502 gives
virtually everything to the qualified holder of a negotiable document of title. The section, however, provides that its rule is
"[s]ubject to the following section .

,,166

that is, subject to the

paramount rights rule itself.
The parties who enjoy paramount rights under section 7503(1) are true owners and secured parties who claim that a person
without authorization bailed the goods and caused a negotiable receipt to come into the hands of a qualified holder. For example, a
thief, who cannot at common law give good title to a purchaser of
goods, may not avoid the thrust of the common-law rule by bailing
the goods. Even though the bailee gives the thief a negotiable document and even though the thief then negotiates that document to
a qualified holder, the holder loses to the
true owner whose rights
1
7
7-503(1).1
section
under
are paramount
The analogy between the paramount rights provision and the
lien provision of section 7-209(3) is perfect: the person with paramount rights contests with the qualified holder just as the claimant
contests with the warehouse. We know, however, that the claimant
is also a true owner or secured party. Thus the person with paramount rights is the claimant. Why, then, does the Code make ref164. Refer to note 34 supra.
165. Note that agency and estoppel are tools in § 7-503 for enhancing the good faith
purchase protection of the qualified holder. Section 7-209 uses the same principles of agency
and estoppel, as the text explains, to enhance the good faith purchase protection of the
warehouse. Agency and estoppel have long been instruments of good faith purchase outside
the bailment area.
166. U.C.C. § 7-502(1).
167. "A thief of the goods cannot indeed by shipping or storing them to his own order
acquire power to transfer them to a good faith purchaser." U.C.C. § 7-503, Comment 1.
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erence to the paramount rights rule which balances the interests of
true owner and qualified holder? Why can the Uniform Act language and its pledge rule which balance the interests of true owner
and pledgee not supply sufficient direction?
There are three possible answers to these questions. The first
is to argue that the reference to section 7-503 constitutes an exception to the rule of the Uniform Act and thus narrows the good
faith purchase shelter; the second is to say that the reference is
redundant and leaves the rule alone; the third is to say, as this
article does, that the reference incorporates additional good faith
purchase rules and thereby broadens the good faith purchase
shelter.
A. The Exception Theory
The syntax of subsection 7-209(3)(a) supports the exception
theory. "[B]ut is not effective . . . against a person with paramount rights . . ." is an infelicitous selection of words to convey

any other meaning." 8 Closer analysis, however, overcomes the
"'plain" meaning the syntax suggests. The fact is that the person
described in the reference, the person with paramount rights,
defeats the lien under the rule of the Uniform Act. As we have
seen from the discussion of the language of the Uniform Act and
the cases construing it, both true owners and secured parties (the
very people who constitute persons with paramount rights) will defeat the warehouse lien, unless they entrust the bailor with possession of the goods in a fashion that a pledge by the bailor would be
valid. The exception theory forces us to the absurd conclusion that
the first clause of subsection 7-209(3)(a) creates a good faith
purchase rule and the second destroys it: "the lien is good against
true owners and secured parties unless they entrust so that a
pledge would be valid, but the lien is not good against true owners
168. The official comment supports the exception reading but assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that the language of the Uniform Act is sufficient to bring notions of agency into the
lien section. '"Te warehouseman may be protected because of the actual, implied or apparent authority of the depositor, because of a Factor's Act, or because of other circumstances
which would protect a bona fide pledgee, unless those circumstances are denied effect under
§ 7-503." U.C.C. § 7-209, Comment 3. It is difficult to see how § 7-503 could deny effect to
facts which trigger the exceptions to the section's paramount rights rule. It is also significant
that the comment refers to Factor's Acts and "other circumstances" in describing the operation of the exceptions to the paramount rights rule. See id. § 7-503, Comment 1. Most significant is the evident belief of the drafters that the lien section gives the warehouse the
benefit of agency rules, as this article contends.
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and secured parties." This reading, furthermore, defies the common sense of good faith purchase, for it destroys the good faith
purchase shelter entirely. In other words, although the exception
theory is consistent with a "plain meaning" approach, it is inconsistent with the historical meaning of the Uniform Act language
and inconsistent with the long tradition of according good faith
purchase protection in at least some instances. We must, therefore,
reject the exception theory, however superficially plausible it may
be.
B.

The Redundancy Theory

The second reading of subsection 7-209(3)(a) ignores the reference to the paramount rights rule. This view notes that after deferring to the paramount rights rule, section 7-503(1) then creates significant exceptions to it. Those exceptions generally include an
idea basic to good faith purchase doctrine: if the bailor had express
or implied authority from the claimant or if the claimant should be
estopped to assert an interest, then the good faith purchaser
prevails. 69 These exceptions derive from notions of agency and estoppel, and this reading concludes that the agency and estoppel
exceptions of section 7-503's paramount rights rule are coterminous with the pledge rule of the Uniform Act.
There is evidence to support the view that the drafters of the
Uniform Act intended to incorporate notions of agency and estoppel into the good17 faith
purchase rule they defined with their
"pledge" language. 0 Note that they frame the rule in terms of
pledges that would be "valid"."" That terminology strongly suggests that the authority of the bailor is at issue, and questions
of authority are questions of agency. It is difficult, moreover, to
distinguish between a principal who impliedly authorizes storage
from a principal who is estopped from asserting its agent's lack of
authority. Implied authority and estoppel in this context are close
169.

See U.C.C. § 7-503(1)(a), (b).

170. Professor Williston and Barry Mohun drafted the Uniform Act in 1906. See
Mohun, The Effect of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 202 (1913)
(largely silent on the meaning of the pledge language in § 28(b)); see also 4 S. WILLISTON &
G. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1058, at 2945 (rev. ed. 1936) (author
cites some of the cases discussed in this article but otherwise sheds no light on the meaning
of § 28(b)).

171.

UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS

AcT § 28(b).
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cousins. It is fair to conclude, as some authorities do, 172 that the
pledge rule of the Uniform Act not only incorporates creditor-priority rules but also incorporates the rules of implied and apparent
authority and of estoppel. Although that view is persuasive, there
is case law explicitly rejecting it,17 3 a number of cases which ignore
it,1U and an indication that Code drafters did not think the Uni175
form Act did the job.

In addition, the view does not explain the Code drafters' decision to leave in the lien section the reference to section 7-503 when
its good faith purchase rule is coterminous with that of the Uniform Act. In other words, this view leads to the conclusion that the
reference to section 7-503's paramount rights rule was a drafting
17 6
oversight and is redundant.

This second theory does overcome the notion, however, that
the reference to the paramount rights rule would destroy the good
faith purchase compromise of the Uniform Act, as the exception
theory does, but the reference would not add anything to the rule
of the Uniform Act. Again, this second reading views the reference
as meaningless surplus.
C. The Extension Theory
That second reading then confronts two objections. First, it
does not make sense for the drafters of the Code to lift language
172.

See T. QuwN,

UssoPm CoMMERCIAL CODE CoUrsMsARY

AND

LAw DiaESr 7-29

& R. BRAucHER, Documam OF Trmr § 4.2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
RIEGERT & BRAucmRn].
173. Refer to note 178 infra.
174. Rejection of the notion that the Uniform Act incorporated agency and estoppel
principles is evident in the fact that the cases virtually never invoke the concepts, even
though such concepts would have significance. In the double bailment cases, refer to notes
138-40 supra and accompanying text, courts could have invoked implied authority theory to
justify rebailment. Similarly, in the evicting constable cases, refer to notes 114-30 supra and
accompanying text, the courts could have argued that a tenant against whom a court has
entered judgment for possession of premises and whose goods are subject to a writ commanding their removal is estopped from denying that authority. As the discussion of the
double bailment and evicting constable cases demonstrates, however, a majority of the
courts fail to invoke these concepts.
175. The drafters acknowledged that courts would sometimes find an implied consent,
"but the drafters felt that such holdings were based on fictions" which might be avoided.
See U.C.C. § 7-209, Comment 2 (1952 version). More often than not, courts were unwilling
to find implied consent in bailment cases. Refer to notes 17 and 174 supra.
176. Professor Riegert and Justice Braucher suggest that the reference to § 7°503 applies only to the warehouse security interest and not to the warehouse lien. RmGoMn &
BRAuCHER, supra note 172, at 64-65.
(1978); R.

REGmr
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from the Uniform Act and add a new clause, when they intended
to fashion a restatement of the Uniform Act. The second objection
lies in the error of assuming that the pledge rule of the Uniform
Act and the exceptions to the paramount rights rule are coterminous. It is true that both rules support good faith purchase shields,
but the scope of the rules differs. As we have seen, courts construed the Uniform Act to protect the good faith purchase warehouse from unperfected secured parties. They gave the warehouse
the rights of a pledgor, a perfected secured party. Courts generally
did not use concepts of apparent or actual authority or estoppel
under the Uniform Act but used notions of perfection and
nonperfection to achieve good faith purchase results. At common
law, of course, courts did invoke agency and estoppel reasoning to
fashion good faith purchase rules, and the exceptions in section 7503(1) to the paramount rights rule are a codification of those efforts. Those efforts, however, were generally confined to the sales
context'"7 and did not extend to the bailee's lien,'7 8 especially after
17 9
adoption of the Uniform Act.

Under those agency and estoppel rules a true owner and a perfected secured party may lose to the good faith purchaser. 180 It is
well settled, for example, that a secured party who leaves goods
with a merchant in the business of selling goods of the kind will
lose to a good faith purchaser. 18' By the same token, a secured
party who leaves goods with a person in the business of storing and
transfering5
177.

2

them by document may be estopped from asserting

See generally R.

ed. 1978); L. VOLD,

BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 202-06 (Raushenbush
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALs 393-96 (2d ed. 1959).

178. Generally, the bailor was a pledgee only if the bailment was authorized.
We see no occasion for a discussion of the question of the implied authority of the
conditional vendee herein to store these goods so as to bind the conditional vendor
for the warehouseman's charges. He would have no such authority under the statute unless he likewise had implied authority to pledge the goods and the latter
proposition cannot be maintained.
Knoxville Outfitting Co. v. Knoxville Fireproof Storage Co., 160 Tenn. 203, 206, 22 S.W.2d
354, 355 (1929) (emphasis added). See generally RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 75 (1941).
Refer to note 16 supra.
179. Refer to note 174 supra.
180. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 7-503(1), Comment 1.
181. Such a good faith purchaser is a buyer in ordinary course, see U.C.C. § 1-201(9),
and falls within the good faith purchase protection of § 9-307(1).
182. The rules of Article 7 protect the qualified holder even though the holder may
not "buy", and a later lender may defeat a prior lender under the interpretation offered by
the text. Compare U.C.C. § 7-501 (definition of the "qualified holder") with U.C.C. § 1201(9) (definition of a buyer in ordinary course); see generally, Dolan, Good Faith
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his interest against a qualified holder.18 3 Under the third reading of
subsection 7-209(3)(a) advanced here, the reference to the paramount rights rule completes the analogy between the lien section
that protects the warehouse and the paramount rights rule whose
exceptions protect the qualified holder. This reading holds that the
secured party who leaves goods with a person in the business of
storing them loses not only to the qualified holder but also to the
warehouse.
The drafting history of the lien section supports this third
reading. The 1952 draft of section 7-209(3) differs markedly from
the version ultimately adopted. The early version consisted of
three rules. The first made the lien effective against the true owner
"unless the warehouseman had notice that the bailor lacked authority. . . ,,1 The second made the warehouse's security interest ineffective against a person with paramount rights,"8 5 and the
third rendered the security interest subject to the rules of Article
9.155 In short, the 1952 draft adopted a good faith purchase rule for
liens as strong as any; arguably strong enough, in fact, to apply to
the thief situation and to render the lien good against an owner
who lost goods to a thief.18 7 The true owner could defeat the warehouse's security interest but not its lien. The breadth of this good
faith purchase treatment of warehouses provoked criticism,18 8 and
the drafters recast the section as it appears today.8 9
Comparison of the 1952 draft and the official version reveals
the pattern of the drafters' concerns. The basic question relates to
the contest between claimants (true owners and their secured creditors) on the one hand and warehouses on the other. The 1952
Purchase,supra note 8.
183. See U.C.C. § 7-503(1), Comment 1.
184. U.C.C. § 7-209(3) (1952 version).
185. Id.
186. The 1952 version provided:
A warehouseman's lien for charges and expenses under subsection (1) is effective
against the bailor or any person entitled to the goods unless the warehouseman
had notice that the bailor lacked authority to subject the goods to such charges
and expenses but a security interest under subsection (2) is not effective against a
person as to whom the document confers no right in the goods covered by it under
Section 7-503, and any security interest reserved by the warehouseman is governed by the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9).
Id.
187. The drafters of the 1952 version, however, argued that the rule of that draft extended only against owners who entrusted. See U.C.C. § 7-209, Comment 2 (1952 version).
188. Refer to note 133 supra.
189. See U.C.C. § 7-209(3) (1958 version).
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draft favored the warehouse (unless it knew of the claimant's interest) in all lien cases. It favored the warehouse in security interest
cases, however, only if the claimant did not have paramount rights.
We know, however, that section 7-503(1) gives all claimants paramount rights,190 and being unwilling to accept the absurd conclusion that the drafters intended the claimant to defeat the security
interest in all cases, we must conclude that the drafters intended
to incorporate the paramount rights rule's agency and estoppel
exceptions.
By the same token we must conclude that when the drafters
revised the lien section and provided that both the warehouse lien
and the warehouse security interest would not be effective against
the person with paramount rights, the drafters intended to incorporate the agency and estoppel rules in a fashion which the Uniform Act's pledge rule had failed to achieve.
It is significant, moreover, that the good faith pledgee rule
rests on the idea that a prior secured party loses to a later secured
party because the prior party failed to observe the perfection rules
and because protection for such party weakens the perfection system.191 The agency and estoppel rules rest on a different premise.
They assume that commercial law should satisfy reasonable commercial expectations and that it is both fair and efficient to penalize a true owner or secured party who introduces goods into commerce, thereby arousing expectations, and then seeks to disappoint
those expectations by pulling the goods back out. Arguably, Code
drafters, desiring to effect a broad rule, referred to section 7-503
and thereby incorporated its agency and estoppel features. The
other readings of the lien section do not withstand analysis.
By bringing agency and estoppel theory into the bailment setting, this reading of subsection 7-209(3)(a) satisfies the efficiency
rationale of good faith purchase. Generally, a secured party and an
owner are in a better position to protect themselves from unauthorized sales or storage than a buyer or warehouse is to search the
title. A secured party may itself hold the goods to prevent the
debtor from storing them.192 If it is not practical for the secured
party to hold the goods, it may use a field warehouse arrange190. Refer to notes 163-67 supra and accompanying text.
191. Refer to notes 84-113 supra and accompanying text.
192. Such possession by the secured party also perfects the security interest without
filing. See U.C.C. § 9-305.
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ment1 93 to control the debtor's access to the goods. It is a fact, of
course, that such activity by the secured party involves expense,'"
but the legislature has decided that lenders and true owners must
bear that expense or the risks and costs inherent in not bearing it.

VI. THE CODE CASES
This discussion completes the analysis of section 7-209 as it
bears on the contest between a true owner and the warehouse. The
section employs two references-one to the Uniform Act and one
to the paramount rights rule. Both of those references carry heavy
good faith purchase freight. The former cuts off the rights of a secured party who fails to perfect its security interest; the latter cuts
off the rights of a true owner or secured party who authorizes (expressly or impliedly) the storage or who is estopped from denying
the bailor's authority.
This analysis reflects the Code drafters' assumptions that
commercial lawyers dealing with the warehouse lien would be conversant with cases construing the Uniform Act and with the paramount rights rule of section 7-503 and the good faith purchase exceptions to it. Those are significant and perhaps unwarranted
assumptions for, as the cases reveal, courts seem largely unaware of
the meaning of the Uniform Act language and do not seem to understand the reference to section 7-503 or even the section's operation.19 5 Review of the cases also indicates that courts are unmindful of the good faith purchase implications which permeate the

inquiry.
The first case is Republic of Austria v. H.G. Ollendorff, Inc.'"
There the plaintiff had loaned a painting to the University of California as part of an exhibit. While the university held the painting,
a third party asserted an ownership interest in it. Pending the resolution of the ownership dispute, the university stored the paint193. For a discussion of field warehousing, see J. WHrrE & R. SusMERS, HANDBOOK ON
CODE 823-27 (2d ed. 1980).
194. One suspects that the expense of field warehousing and uneasiness stemming
from its esoteric connotations have left this commercial device unused in many settings
where it would be efficient. What is worse, creditors who fail to use it then argue that the
law should protect them from purchasers. See, eg., Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis.
2d 219, 240, 208 N.W.2d 97, 107 (1973) (arguments of the commercial finance industry).
195. Confusion over § 7-503 arises not only in the warehouse lien context but also in
connection with cases arising under the paramount rights rule itself. See generally Dolan,
Good Faith Purchase,supra note 8.
196. 7 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 535 (N.Y. County Sup. CL 1970).
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ing. Subsequently, the third party relinquished his claim, and the
plaintiff brought a replevin action against the defendant warehouse
that claimed a lien. The court rejected the lien argument in a terse
holding that the plaintiff was neither the bailor nor "a person sub'
ject to the lien."197
The opinion does not tell us much, but the facts indicate that
the plaintiff may very well be a person subject to the lien. If, for
example, the plaintiff knew of the third party's claim or if in the
course of preparing or moving the exhibit the university might
have to store the painting, it would be proper to hold that the
plaintiff impliedly authorized the storage. In that event, of course,
section 7-209 would make the lien good against the true owner/
plaintiff.
Such a holding, moreover, comports well with good faith
purchase analysis. If the university's conduct in storing the painting was reasonable, there are good policy reasons to make the
plaintiff pay. First, any other rule forces the warehouse to charge
for the uncertainty such a rule creates. If the Austrian goverment
wants to foster good will by lending its paintings, it ought to pay
for storage when a bailee reasonably concludes that it is necessary
to store one of the paintings and is unable or unwilling to pay for
that storage. The owner, not the warehouse, should bear the burden of collecting from the university. Some may not find this argument convincing, but surely the language of the statute and the
good faith purchase policy it serves commands an inquiry,
whatever the outcome. It is not enough, then, to discuss the lien
claim without that inquiry.
198 is the first of several double bailment
Nikolas v. Patrick
cases. In Nikolas the plaintiff stored furniture with a warehouse
that subsequently terminated its operations. Upon termination the
warehouse rebailed the goods with the defendant who was asserting a lien in the face of the plaintiff's replevin action.
The defendant argued that by referring to the paramount
rights rule of section 7-503, the lien provision (section 7-209) carried the negative implication that if the first warehouse had actual
or implied authority to restore the goods, the lien would be good
against the true owner. 199 In short, the defendant made the same
197. Id. at 536.
198. 51 Mich. App. 561, 215 N.W.2d 715 (1974).
199. Id. at 565-66, 215 N.W.2d at 718.
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argument this article makes.
The court rejected the defendant's reading of section 7-209,

holding that such an interpretation of the reference to section 7503 would render the Uniform Act language redundant. The court

concluded the defendant's reading must be wrong.2 00 The court,
however, did not say what the reference meant. It simply ruled
against the lien. It noted that Michigan had not adopted the
household goods rule and inferred from that fact an intent on the
part of the legislature not to promote the very position advanced
by the warehouse. 0 '
Nikolas makes two mistakes. First, contrary to its own aver-

sion to redundancy, it falls into the redundancy reading of section
7-209 and thereby reads out of the section language the legislature
put in it. Second, it follows the "poor beacon"2 2 of legislative silence in concluding that the legislature did not want a result ordained by the section without the amendment.
The Nikolas court cites Ollendorff with approval, and both
cases stand as authority for reading the lien section without any

good faith purchase considerations. Just as that reading smacked
of inefficiency in Ollendorff, so does it in Nikolas. What difference

does it make to the true owner whether X Warehouse holds the
goods or Y Warehouse-holds them, and why should the law provide
that the owner must pay X for that storage but need not pay Y for
it? What is a warehouse to do if it desires to terminate operations

but is unable to find all of its customers? Certainly it should rebail
the goods absent instructions. Yet the rule of Nikolas makes that
200. Id. at 565-66, 215 N.W.2d at 718.
201. Id. at 565-66, 215 N.W.2d at 718.
202. "Legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory
route." Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969). Even though Congress has remained silent
by not adopting the Code for commercial transactions governed by federal law, the Supreme
Court has ruled that federal courts should use the Code for disputes so governed. See
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). In some cases the courts have
read amendments to the Code as clarification of rather than change in the law. See Kahn v.
Capital Bank, 29 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Domain Indus. v. First
Security Bank, 230 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Iowa 1975). Often the "reasons for change" prepared
by the Article 9 Review Committee, which fashioned the 1972 amendments to Article 9,
explicitly declare that such amendments are made to clarify the rules or to remove uncertainties. See, e.g., PEmAN v EDrroRiAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMUERCL CODE REvIEw
COMMITTEE FOR AwR. 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REP. 25, 35, 58, 63, 195

(1971). The conclusion, then, that because a legislature has not adopted an amendment, a
priori the legislature does not approve of the amendment's rule, is not warranted. It is especially unwarranted in construing the Code where many amendments are simply efforts at
clarification.
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rebailment problematical, because it fashions a rule which ensures
that the second warehouse will have trouble getting paid. Nikolas,
nonetheless, is the leading case.
In Disch v. Raven Transfer & Storage Co., 20 3 a Washington
court followed Nikolas in holding that the legislature's failure to
adopt the household goods rule signaled a desire to restrict the
scope of the lien. In Disch the plaintiff leased a furnished house to
a tenant who stored the goods. The court reviewed the language of
section 7-209 carefully. It concluded that the reference to the Uniform Act means that the "pledge" rules of Article 9 apply 0 ' and
that the reference to section 7-503 incorporates the agency and estoppel provisions of that section. The court ruled, however, that
neither of those good faith purchase provisions applied 20 5
The Disch case, then, differs markedly from Ollendorff and
Nikolas, even though it cites Nikolas with apparent approval.
Disch implicitly accepts the two-step approach to section 7-209 advocated here and, what is more, the Disch facts do nbt support a
good faith purchase result. It is one thing to say that a warehouse
has implied authority to rebail goods; it is another to say that the
lessee of a furnished house has implied authority to bail goods.
Disch approaches the theft situation-that boundary beyond
which good faith purchase may not extend. Disch demonstrates,
furthermore, the reach of the household goods rule, for had the
Washington legislature adopted the household goods amendment
of subsection 7-209(3)(b), the warehouse would have prevailed
even though it loses under traditional good faith purchase analysis.
Less satisfactory than Disch is a Tennessee court's handling of
a classic warehouse lien dispute in K Furniture Co. v. Sanders
Transfer & Storage Co.20 6 In K Furniture the parties stipulated

that Price purchased furniture from the plaintiff, who retained a
perfected security interest. Price then stored the goods, and the
warehouse asserted its lien against the secured party. Clearly, the
Uniform Act language, as courts have construed it, does not help
the warehouse. Under Article 9, Price does not have the power to
203.
204.

17 Wash. App. 73, 561 P.2d 1097 (1977).
Id. at 76, 561 P.2d at 1099.

205. The court refused to apply the "pledge" rules of Article 9, because, it held, the
bailor had no interest in the goods. Id. at 76-77, 561 P.2d at 1099-1100. Under § 9-203, there
can be no pledge unless the pledgor has an interest in the collateral pledged. The court did
not explain the reason it refused to invoke the agency or estoppel rules of § 7-503, but the
facts support a rule denying an agency or estoppel result. Id. at 74, 561 P.2d at 1098.
206.

532 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1975).
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make a pledge which will defeat a perfected security interest.' It
is a strained interpretation of the facts, moreover, to say that the
secured seller impliedly authorized the storage or that it acquiesced in the storage. Thus, the second good faith purchase rule of
section 7-209 does not help the warehouse.208
K Furniture, then, demonstrates the hiatus the household
goods rule amendment is designed to breach. In the noncomercial setting it is difficult to find facts supporting the authority or
estoppel bases for invoking good faith purchase. The warehouse
will lose to the claimant unless the claimant is an unperfected secured party. Given this hiatus in good faith protection, the warehouse may be reluctant to accept household goods and theoretically will pass the cost of the risk that hiatus creates on to its
customer. The 1966 amendment to section 7-209, by creating a
third good faith purchase rule for household goods, is designed to
eliminate that reluctance and reduce that cost.2 09
The final case involves the evicting constable. Cordle v. Lincoln Moving & Storage, Inc.21 ° follows the now familiar pattern.
Owners of the household goods left them in a leased apartment
and failed to pay the rent. The landlord obtained a writ of restitution, and the constable removed the goods to the defendant warehouse. Relying on the Ollendorff and Nikolas cases, the court held
that the constable had no authority to store the goods 21 ' and,
therefore, that the lien was not good against the true owners. The
court noted that had Nebraska adopted the 1966 amendment the
result might be different.2 12 It would be different because the
amendment requires only that the bailor of household goods be the
207. Under the general priority rule a pledge subsequent to a perfected security interest is subordinate to that interest. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).

208. The K Furniturecourt concluded that there were no facts to support application
of the agency or estoppel rules of § 7-503. By implication, the court accepted the notion that
the reference to § 7-503 incorporates those rules. Strangely, the K Furniture court cites
Nikolas in support of its reading of the reference. 532 S.W.2d at 912.

209. "The purpose of the exception is to permit the warehouseman to accept household goods for storage in sole reliance on the value of the goods themselves, especially in
situations of family emergency." U.C.C. § 7-209, Comment 3.
210. 19 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1204 (Neb. Dist. Ct. 1976).
211. But cf. Wegwart v. Eagle Movers, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (a Code

case; the court found express authority to store in the Wisconsin forcible detainer statute);
refer to note 115 supra; cf. Bentinck v. Menotti, 97 Cal. App. 412, 275 P. 850 (1929); J.L
Case Plow Works v. Union Iron Works, 56 Mo. App. 1 (1894) (an attaching officer is authorized by statute to store goods and incur warehouse charges).
212. 19 U.C.C. REP. SeRV. at 1205.
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"legal possessor"2 1 3 of them.
The Cordle court, however, may have overlooked an opportunity to apply the agency and estoppel rules incorporated into the
lien section by the reference to section 7-503. Certainly the owner
of goods who leaves them in leased premises ought to pay for their
storage after a writ of restitution issues. That writ stems from a
judicial determination made in accordance with due process that
the owner of the goods is not entitled to leave them at the leased
premises. 214 It is in nobody's interest to leave such goods on the
sidewalk.2 1 5 Good faith purchase analysis suggests that courts
should infer the authority to store or should estop the true owner
from denying that authority in the evicting constable cases.2 10

VII. RECAPITULATION
A.

Section 7-209(3)

This study consists of two themes. One deals with a narrow
provision in the Documents of Title Article. The analysis reflects
three good faith purchase rules in that provision. The first is that
which incorporates the language of the Uniform Act. It makes the
warehouse lien effective against any person who "so entrusted the
bailor with possession of the goods that a pledge of them by him to
a good faith purchaser for value would have been valid. .. .
That language has the effect of giving the warehouse the rights of
an Article 9 secured party who perfected a security interest by possession on the date of the bailment and specifically permits the
213. U.C.C. § 7-209(3)(b).
214. This analysis of Cordle exposes the fallacious suggestion in Nikolas that the failure of the legislature to adopt the 1966 amendments indicates an intent to inhibit the
agency and estoppel argument raised in that case. Refer to text accompanying note 158
supra. The "legal possessor" rule of § 7-209(3)(b) operates in a different context from that
in which the agency and estoppel rule operates. Thus, even if the legislaturo's failure to
adopt the amendment reflects animus toward the legal possessor rule, that failure need not
indicate animus toward agency and estoppel notions.
215. It was raining at the time the constable in Cordle executed the writ. 19 U.C.C.
REP. SERv. at 1205.

216. It will not do to ignore the fact that the rule advocated by the text may deprive
poor persons of their household possessions. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
166 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting). An enlightened and aflluent society cannot let the poor
go without basic necessities. However, only those who apply tortured logic will leap from
that premise to the conclusion that the warehouse industry and its customers ought to bear
the cost of that social requisite. The Cordle holding mandates that illogical conclusion.
217. U.C.C. § 7-209(3)(a).
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warehouse to defeat prior unperfected security interests in the
goods.
The second good faith purchase rule arises out of the inartful
reference to the paramount rights rule and provides that the Hen
shall not be good "against a person as to whom the document confers no right in the goods covered by it under section 7-503."118
This reference invokes the agency and estoppel exceptions of the
paramount rights provision. Thus if the court decides that a true
owner of goods or a party with a security interest in them actually
or impliedly authorized their bailment or acquiesced in their bailment, the lien should be good against that owner or secured party.
The third good faith purchase rule, adopted in only fifteen
jurisdictions, 219 appears in subsection 3(b) and renders the lien
effective against the true owner of household goods if the bailor
was the legal possessor of them. This third rule has special significance in evicting constable cases where it mandates a result for the
warehouse.
B.

Good Faith Purchase

The second and more subtle theme of this piece has broader
import. The melodies of property law are contrapuntal. At times
security of property and security of purchase compete with each
other for the ear of the law. At those times courts and legislatures
must harmonize them. While that harmony is not the product of
vogue or trend, these doctrines are prerogatives, not ideologies. We
invoke them to satisfy the demands of what this generation calls
"efficiency" and what earlier generations called "fairness" or "culpability." Security of property remains the first melody, and good
faith purchase the second. As Professor Rosenthal tells us, we must
decide who needs the benefit of good faith purchase before we invoke it. 22e That decision requires thoughtful evaluation of commer218. Id.
219. Refer to note 37 supra.
220. It would be a mistake to read Professor Gilmore's article and Professor Rosenthal's article as attacks on good faith purchase per se. See Gilmore, Formalism and the Law
of Negotiable Instruments, supra note 2; Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, supra
note 4. Those articles actually use good faith purchase inquiry. They consider the fairness
and efficiency of protecting a purchaser. They conclude that fairness and efficiency do not
support that protection in some instances, and they urge, therefore, that the law withhold it
in those instances. Professor Rosenthal's question is not rhetorical. His thesis is that only
those who need good faith purchase protection should get it.
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cial facts. Unless that evaluation supports application of good faith
purchase, we must fall back to the first principle, security of property, and rule against the purchaser.

